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The authority of United States administrative law judges (ALJs),
formerly known as “hearing examiners,”1 comes from the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 designed to promote public
confidence in government and reduce the appearance of bias.3
Before adoption, administrative adjudication was haphazard and had
a bad reputation for being arbitrary, as the perception was that agency
“hacks” could be forced to rubberstamp agency determinations.
Agencies have a natural tendency to promote from within and are
jealous of their jurisdictional prerogatives, so the centerpiece of
reform was to safeguard that future adjudicators would be selected
through merit selection of impartial trial lawyers and that they would
be provided decisional independence.4 In addition, two other major
purposes of the APA are:
(1) To require agencies to keep the public informed
of their organization, procedures and rules; and

*

Administrative law judge, United States Department of Labor; liaison
member of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); past
president of FALJC, past chair, NCALJ, Judicial Division, American Bar
Association (ABA) and past long time member of the ABA House of Delegates.
Author, BREAKING UP WITH CUBA (2011). The remarks do not represent those of
the Department of Labor or any other organization.
Thanks to Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law,
Washington College of Law, American University, for his comments.
1

5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (2006). Scholars
date the first use of administrative law judges to the year 1789, when officers were
appointed to determine the disability of Revolutionary War soldiers and officers
who adjudicated custom duties. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 17.11 at 313 (2d ed., 1978).
2
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et. seq.).
3
See Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1950).
4
The Federal judiciary has institutional independence, due the separation of
powers. Under the APA, administrative law judges have “special status” and a
“qualified right” of decisional independence. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d
Cir. 1989).
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(2) To establish uniform standards for the conduct of
formal rulemaking and adjudication.5
I.

OVERVIEW

Today agency adjudication far exceeds the volume of the Federal
courts, and although many APA hearings are just like Federal bench
trials,6 and all agencies could be required to standardize, due process
is not applied uniformly at more than twenty-nine separate fiefdoms.7
However, it should not be that way. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the
Supreme Court determined that the APA must be applied uniformly
except where Congress has expressly stated otherwise.8
Unfortunately, this rule has been overlooked.
In recent years, the quantum of administrative adjudication has
statistically exploded. In 1946, there were less than 200 hearing
officers in the government. By last count, more than 1500
administrative law judges work for twenty-eight agencies and hold
hearings involving hundreds of statutes.9 By 1961, President John F.

See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1947). Other primary purposes are:
1. To provide for public participation in the rulemaking process;
2. To define the scope of judicial review.
6
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Federal Maritime Comm’n v.
South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Rhode Island Dep’t of
Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that
Department of Labor ALJs are functionally equivalent to Federal District Court
judges). Whereas a trial judge’s principal responsibility is to conduct trials before
juries that determine the facts of a dispute, we must determine both fact and law
and reduce our factual rulings to writing.
7
This article discusses only “formal” adjudications involving trial-like
hearings with witness testimony, a written record, and a final decision. Under
“informal” adjudication, some agency decisions are made using “inspections,
conferences and negotiations” rather than a “hearing on the record.” The
legislative intent of the APA comes in part from the FINAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO.
8,
77th
Cong.
(1st
Sess.
1941),
available
at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/pdfdownload/apa1941.pdf (last visited Mar.
26, 2013) [hereinafter “FINAL REPORT”].
8
527 U.S. 150 (1999).
9
See Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge
Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 476 (2011). Although
5
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Kennedy acknowledged that APA cases “permeate every sphere and
almost every activity of our national life [and] have a profound effect
upon the direction of our economic growth.”10 Although not all
adjudication is governed by the APA, the Social Security
Administration, standing alone, administers the largest system of
adjudication in the world.11

Professor Lubbers advises that the growth of APA adjudication has increased
primarily at SSA and is in decline elsewhere, as stated later, I find that the
published studies have been quite deficient.
This view does not account for the exploding volume of Medicare appeals now
heard by a separate agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid.
This view also does not account for the dozens of new areas of adjudication
added by the past several Congresses. For example, at my agency, the Department
of Labor, cases that may take days or weeks to hear, and more time to write, such
as under whistleblower Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) claims, now dominate our
dockets. Others include whistleblower claims under National Transit Systems
Security Act of 2007; the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008;
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Section 1012, as amended by the FDA Food Safety
and Modernization Act (FSMA); the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
and the Seamen’s Protection Act. Moreover our “traditional” cases, such as H-1B
Visa cases, are on the rise.
10
President John F. Kennedy, H.R. DOC. NO. 135, 57th Cong., at 1–2 (1st
Sess. 1961), quoted in Macy, The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products of a
Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B. J. 351, 353 (1967) and in Victor Palmer and
Elmer S. Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges as an
Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 673, 674 (1983–
1984).
11
Information About Social Security’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_odar.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013). “[T]he Chief Administrative Law Judge directs a
nationwide field organization consisting of 10 regional offices, 169 hearing offices
(including 7 satellite offices), 5 national hearing centers, and 1 national case
assistance center.” Id. In fiscal year 2011, SSA hearings offices issued over
793,000 adjudications, of which approximately 740,000 were
issued by [administrative law judges] and over 53,000 were
issued by Attorney Adjudicators. An Attorney Adjudicator can
issue an allowance decision that does not require a hearing. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.942, 416.1442. Of the 740,000 dispositions
issued by administrative law judges, approximately 629,000
dispositions resulted in an allowance or denial decision, and the
remaining 111,000 dispositions were dismissals of the hearing
request. A hearing request can be dismissed for a variety of
reasons, including failure of the claimant to appear at the hearing,
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As administrative adjudication began to increase, especially when
the Franklin Roosevelt administration introduced more regulation,
legal experts contemplated how to best extend due process rights.12
The APA idea may first have been suggested in May 1933, by an
American Bar Association Special Committee on Administrative
Law.13 To avoid the appearance of bias, the ABA determined that
the “‘judicial function’ [of each agency] . . . should be transferred to
an independent tribunal or, alternatively, that officials’ decisions
should be completely reviewable on the facts as well as on the law by
a tribunal marked by judicial independence.”14 To administrative law
judges, as well as many litigants, and those concerned with judicial
economy, this goal became a quest.
II. THE CORPS CONCEPT
In 1936, legislation was offered to consolidate Article I courts
with hearing examiners.15 However, lawyers that appeared before
certain agencies such as Customs, Tax, and the Patent Office opposed

the claimant choosing to withdraw the hearing request, or death
of the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957, 416.1457.
SSA OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT A07-12-21234: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES’ DECISIONS 1 n.2 (2012). See also CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE REPORT A-12-11-01138: OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
WORKLOAD TRENDS (2012); JERRY L. MASHAW, ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARINGS AND APPEALS 1 (1978) and RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 8.1 (5th ed. 2010).
12
The Classification Act of 1923 placed hearing examiners as “mere tools of
the Agency” and thus did not have decisional independence. See Ramspeck v. Fed.
Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
13
Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA.
L. REV. 219 (1986).
14
Id. In 1934 the ABA proposed legislation to create “a federal administrative
court with branches and an appellate division, or, failing that, ‘an appropriate
number of independent tribunals’ unencumbered by ‘legislative and executive
functions.’” Id.
15
S. 5154, 70th Cong. (2d Sess. 1939). See Testimony of Abraham Alan
Dash, Esquire, Professor of Law, University of Maryland, Cong. Rec., S. 1275,
89th Cong, at 97 (June 23, 1983) [hereinafter “Testimony of Dash”]. See also
Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 219.
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the Bill, and the legislation failed. Subsequently, Congressional
committees considered the issue and agreed that uniformity should be
applied but could not reach a consensus on the details. In 1939,
President Roosevelt asked the Attorney General to study
administrative law.
The Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure studied the methods, rules and regulations
and the general effects on the public. “Forty agencies and distinct
entities within departments were studied; twenty-seven descriptive
and evaluative monographs” were published.16 The research was
circulated and after public notice and individual invitations to
100,000 interested individuals, public hearings were held to receive
oral or written opinions about administrative procedure.17
In anticipation of the Attorney General’s Committee report, a
“Walter-Logan Bill” version of the APA was passed, containing the
ABA recommendations. However, since it was passed before the
Committee report was completed, it was vetoed by President
Roosevelt.18
Within the Attorney General’s Committee, a majority supported:
(1) Creation of an Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure, with continuing responsibility and power
to seek just and efficient discharge of official duties,
and also to appoint and remove hearing
commissioners;
(2) Publication of rules, policies, and interpretations;
formulation and effective date of rules; requests for
promulgation or amendment of a rule;

16

See Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 226. See also S. DOC. NO. 10-77 (1941); S.
DOC. NO. 186-76, (1940).
17
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 8-77, at 1 (1941).
18
See 86 Cong. Rec. 13,942–43 (1940) (President’s veto message), reprinted
in 27 A.B.A.J. 52 (1941). “The President attached to his veto message an extended
analysis of the bill by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, “pointing out some of
the perhaps unintended consequences of the bill’s excessively generalized
provisions.” See Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 226 n.22. See also 86 Cong. Rec.
13,943–45 (1940).
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(3) Utilization of hearing commissioners in formal
adjudicatory
proceedings,
a
statement
of
commissioners’ powers and duties, and of the effect
and reviewability of their decisions;
(4) Empowerment of agencies to issue a judicially
reviewable declaratory ruling in order to terminate a
controversy or remove an uncertainty.
The minority members of the Committee also requested:
(1) The separation of prosecuting and judicial
functions,
(2) The scope and practice of judicial review, and
(3) A “Code of Standards of Fair Procedure.”
According to Gellhorn, a member of the Committee, now known
as the “father” of the APA, haggling among the Attorneys General,
including Robert Jackson and eventually Tom Clark, who would later
become Supreme Court justices, and the Congress, homogenized the
issues so that it “seemed somewhat anticlimactic” by the time that the
APA passed on May 24, 1946.19 At passage, there was “no
indication of dissent.”20 In any event, the APA did not address
whether hearing officers should be employed by a single agency,
constitute an Article I court, or remain with their agencies.
The APA does not require an agency to provide a hearing, but
when it does so, it must be heard by an administrative law judge or
the head of the agency. Section 11 of the APA was intended as a
Federal Bill of Rights for adjudicators, providing that:



19
20

Examiners shall perform no duties inconsistent
with their duties and responsibilities as hearing
examiners;
Examiners are removable only for “good cause”
established by the Civil Service Commission; only
after an opportunity for an oral hearing and upon
the record thereof; and

Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 232–33.
Id. at 232.
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Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed
by the commission independently of agency
recommendations or rating21

In 1972, the title “hearing examiner” was changed to
“Administrative Law Judge.”22 These Section 11 protections were
later incorporated into descriptions of the administrative law judge
positions adopted by the Civil Service Commission and later the
Office of Personnel management. The Administrative Law Judge
position is the only merit-selected judicial position in the Federal
system.23

21

Ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1944) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
7521(a)).
22
See Bernard G. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of
Progress and the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1425 (1976).
23
Applicants must be licensed attorneys “authorized to practice law under the
laws of a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or
any territorial court,” who have a minimum of seven years of “experience as a
licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or reviewing formal hearings
or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the Federal, State, or local
level.” Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, U.S.
OFFICE
OF
PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT,
http://www.opm.gov/qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
According to a 1992 ACUS study, the APA
contemplated the existence of impartial factfinders, with
substantive expertise in the subjects relevant to the adjudications
over which they preside, who would be insulated from the
investigatory and prosecutorial efforts of employing agencies
through protections concerning hiring, salary, and tenure, as well
as separation-of-functions requirements. The decisions of such
impartial factfinders were made subject to broad review by
agency heads to ensure that the accountable appointee at the top
of each agency has control over the policymaking for which the
agency has responsibility.
Paul Verkuil, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, ACUS Recommendation 92-7,
ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES,
http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/federal-administrative-judiciary (last visited
Mar. 26, 2013) (adopted on Dec. 10, 1992).
When I applied for a position in the 1980s, minimum requirements included
production of evidence for fifteen civil jury trials I had been involved with; twenty
professional references; seven years litigation experience; a written test; and an
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After enactment of the APA, the Hoover Commission,24 the 1971
Ash Commission,25 the LaMacchia Committee Report of the 1974
Civil Service Commission,26 and the 1977 Bork Commission27 all
recommended a unified corps.28 In fact, the Bork Committee
proposed an Article I trial division within the judiciary branch, which
“could serve the function now served by administrative law
judges.”29

interview by a panel that included one judge, one member of the bar, and one
agency person. Dozens of people, including several judges, reported that my
background and trial experience was investigated.
24
Actually, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government was appointed by President Harry S. Truman in 1947 to recommend
administrative changes in the Federal Government of the United States. It took its
nickname from former President Herbert Hoover, who was appointed by Truman to
chair it. A second Hoover Commission was created by Congress in 1953, during
the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Also headed by Hoover—
who was then almost eighty years old—the second commission sent its final report
to Congress in June 1955.
25
Named for Roy Ash, former CEO of Litton Industries, appointed in 1968, by
President Richard M. Nixon, to create and lead the President’s Advisory Council
on Executive Organization, which later came to be known as the Ash Commission.
The reports of the Commission also lead to the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
26
See U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY
OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1974). Chaired by the
Civil Service Commission’s then Deputy Counsel, Phillip LaMacchia, it sought the
views of administrative law judges and sampled the opinions of federal agency
officials, private practitioners, and Bar Association representatives about the
quality and quantity of administrative law judge work products, relationships
between judges and their agencies, standards of review of administrative law judge
decisions, and criteria for recruitment of administrative law judges. See id.
Although the final report found that an independent corps appears to be
organizationally feasible and may be an effective approach, it also found that more
information and detailed planning and analysis was needed. “The matter warrants
consideration of a recommendation to institute and fund a professional
management analysis of the feasibility and public benefit consequence of this
proposal.” Id. at 4–5.
27
COMMISSION ON THE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 42381 NCJ (1977)
(hereinafter “BORK COMMISSION REPORT”).
28
Testimony of Dash, supra note 15.
29
BORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 7–11.
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Critics charged that administrative law judges constituted an
invisible judiciary that held secret proceedings and that litigants
before some agencies were trapped in a complex world of
bureaucracy and red tape.30
Although the Civil Service Commission initially had procedural
jurisdiction over administrative law judges, in 1979 the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) succeeded the Commission and was
mandated to administer an Administrative Law Judge program and to
maintain a register of qualified applicants and test and evaluate
prospective applicants.31 “The classification of ‘administrative law
judge’ is reserved by OPM for the specific class of appointments
made under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and applies to all agencies.”32
30

Remarks of Representative Austin Murphy, in introducing the Corps Bill,
March 1, 1989 [hereinafter “Murphy Remarks”]. The notion that administrative
law judges were invisible was furthered after Jeffrey S. Lubbers used the term in
his paper, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary,
33 ADMIN. L. REV. 123 (1981). Professor Lubbers advised me in an email, “that
article certainly was not critical of ALJs nor did it imply that they held secret
proceedings or that the litigants were ‘trapped’ . . . . My title was simply intended
to indicate that the administrative judiciary was not well known and that ALJs were
doing their important jobs in an unseen way.”
31
The United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is an
independent agency of the United States government that manages the civil service
of the federal government. The commission was abolished and replaced by OPM
on January 1, 1979 following the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 36037, 92 Stat. 3783.
32
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, infra note 49, at 2 n.2.
The title “administrative law judge” is the official class title for
an administrative law judge position. Each agency will use only
this official class title for personnel, budget, and fiscal purposes.
5 C.F.R. § 930.203b. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 requires OPM to
conduct competitive examinations for administrative law judge
positions and defines an administrative law judge position as one
in which any portion of the duties includes those which require
the appointment of an administrative law judge under 5 U.S.C. §
3105. ALJs can only be appointed after certification by OPM:
“[a]n agency may make an appointment to an administrative law
judge position only with the prior approval of OPM, except when
it makes its appointment from a certificate of eligibles furnished
by OPM.” 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a; see also 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2000)
(providing for pay for administrative law judges, also subject to
OPM approval).
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The APA contemplated that the Civil Service
Commission would oversee merit selection and
appointment of ALJs and would also act as an
ombudsman for the ALJ program, but OPM has
essentially abandoned that role.
Section 1305
provides that, for the purpose of sections 3105
(appointment), 3344 (loans), and 5372 (pay), OPM
may investigate, prescribe regulations, appoint
advisory committees as necessary, recommend
legislation, subpoena witnesses and records, and pay
witness fees.33
By the late 1970s, several suggestions coalesced into a unified
concept after ABA President Bernard Segal requested creation of a
Corps of Administrative Law Judges.34
Congress considered
enactment. According to sponsors of the legislation, a corps would
“serve to dismiss one of the oldest problems facing the Federal
administrative judiciary, the question of judicial impartiality.”35 To
some of the public, despite the intent of the APA, administrative law
judges still looked like agency hacks, who would defer, if not submit,
to agency authority. Besides an appearance of bias, it was also
alleged that as agency employees, administrative law judges were
vulnerable to a variety of subtle—and not so subtle—pressures from
their employing agency.36

Id. at 2.
33
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, infra note 49, at 4 (quotation marks omitted).
See also 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012).
34
Bernard Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress and
the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424 (1976).
35
Id. at 1424 n.30 (“A direct result of the present structure of the
administrative hearing system is a public concern that ALJ’s, because they are
agency employees, are not impartial. The comments of one pro se litigant
defending himself against U.S. Department of Labor’s charges of violating the
Davis-Bacon Act aptly summed up public suspicion of the Federal administrative
judiciary. The defendant complained, ‘How can I expect to win this case when the
Department of Labor is my accuser, prosecutor and judge?’”)
36
Id. (“An agency’s control over promotional opportunities, office space and
support staff is a source of very real power and control over administrative law
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Some of these complaints were substantiated, especially those
directed at the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA). Most of
the allegations of improper agency interference and demands for a
corps came from administrative law judges at SSA—by far the
largest employer of administrative law judges—and by
representatives of claimants. After the agency refused to bargain
with them, judges sued to enforce Section 11 of the APA. In 1979,
while a case to enforce the APA protections was pending,37
Congressional hearings revealed that the agency was at war with
itself.38 The agency and the judges entered a consent order. SSA
agreed:
1. Not to set quotas, and /or goals in numbers of cases to be
scheduled, heard or decided in given periods of time;
2. To assign cases in strict rotation;
3. On remand, to re-assign cases only with the consent of the
judge who was originally assigned the case; and
4. To abandon a criticized quality review system that would
have permitted the agency to rate and evaluate the individual
performance of administrative law judges.
SSA also decided not to impose a proposed hearing office manager
position that would have removed control of the staff from the judges
and have given it to a non-judge management official.39

judges. Even though most agencies refrain from exerting pressure to influence
their judge’s decisions, the fact that such pressure may be applied compromises the
integrity of the entire system.”)
37
Charles N. Bono et al. v. United States of America, United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri, Civil Action No. 77-0819-CV-4 (W.D.
Mo. 1979).
38
Social Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and Issue Paper,
Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong.
96-2 (1979); see also FRANK B. BOROWIEC, UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW: IN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AN AGENCY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(iUniverse.com, 2011). At one time, Judge Borowiec was Regional Chief Judge,
Atlanta Region, and was also an officer of AALJ.
39
Charles N. Bono, The Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law Judge
at the Office of Hearings and Appeals in the Social Security Administration, 15 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 235 (1995). According to Judge Bono, shortly
after the case was filed, Associate Commissioner Louis B. Hayes issued a
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In 1981, after the agency had removed hundreds of thousands of
disability recipients from the rolls without a hearing, a Bellmon
Review Program, “a series of measures reportedly designed to
improve decisional quality and accuracy,”40 was accelerated, which
led to “own motion” review of thousands of cases that had not been
appealed.41 Judges’ decisions, usually awards of benefits to
disability claimants, were administratively overturned and remanded
for new hearings, and individual judges who had a high number of
memorandum to the judges announcing a “Bellmon Review” of judges who had
allowed more than 66 2/3% of their cases, as it was determined that judges who
allowed more were aberrational and needed to be studied to determine how to
counsel them. Certain judges had been selected and notified to appear for
“counseling.” The judges who were about to be “counseled” called upon the
Association for help, and their cause was included in the litigation. The court
issued a protective order, and the judges never had to appear for their behavior
modification training; but the issue of Bellmon Review remained. So not only was
it obvious to the judges that they had a numerical quota to meet, but a new twist
had been added to caution them that if they allowed too many cases, as compared
to the national average, they would be identified, and counseled. It was later in the
trial of the case learned that in the performance plan of the Associate
Commissioner Louis B. Hayes, one of his charges was to reduce the allowance rate
overall in the hearings and appeals system.
The case was tried for two weeks, taken under advisement by the court, and
pending the decision the agency announced by memorandum to the judges that it
was discontinuing Bellmon Review. The case was dismissed in 1985 by the court,
on the basis that the issue was moot, that the Association had reformed the agency,
and that attorneys’ fees were paid by the agency. See generally id.
40
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1134
(D.D.C. 1984). The “Bellmon Review Program” was named after the Bellmon
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-265 (1980) (discussed at 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982)).
The Amendment referred to Section 304(g) of Pub. L. No. 96-265, the “Social
Security Disability Amendments of 1980,” set forth that SSA institute a program of
ongoing review of administrative law judge decisions.
41
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1133.
Initially, individual ALJs with allowance rates of 70% or higher
were to have 100% of their allowance decisions reviewed for
accuracy and hearing offices with allowance rates of 74% or
higher would also be reviewed. 106 ALJs, or approximately 13%
of all ALJs in SSA, were placed on Bellmon Review because of
their high allowance rates. The selection of entire hearing offices
for review was soon discontinued.
Id. at 1134.
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awards were targeted as outliers. Legislation to encourage SSA to revisit cases every three years under Continuing Disability Review
(CDR) increased the dockets, and pressure was applied to obtain
greater administrative law judge productivity, as lower producing
judges were also targeted.
At the same time, under a policy of “non-acquiescence,” SSA
took the position that only the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States were binding on it. It made exceptions for those
decisions that the agency chose to adopt by changing the regulations
and to those decisions it decided to acquiesce. This infuriated many
Circuit Court and other Federal judges, and in several cases the
agency was held in contempt for missing judicially imposed
deadlines42 or failing to follow orders of United States Circuit Courts
of Appeal.43
Administrative law judges at SSA were convinced that if the
agency could not retaliate against the courts, it projected totem
animus on them. In at least one case involving judges’ allegations of
agency hostility to judicial independence, a United States District
Court concluded that the agency’s “unremitting focus on allowance
rates in the individual ALJ portion of the Bellmon Review Program
created an untenable atmosphere of tension and unfairness which
violated the spirit of the APA . . . .”44 The Senate Subcommittee on
42

In the 1980s, SSA was missing court ordered deadlines as often as 90% of
the time, and contempt citations from district courts were common. Koch and
David Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, n.320
(1990).
43
See, e.g., Hutchison v. Chater, 99 F.3d 286, 287–88 (8th Cir. 1996);
Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom.,
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432
(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328
(1983). In others, contempt was threatened. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717
F.2d 813, 824 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J., concurring); Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d
428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J., concurring specially); Valdez v.
Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 n.3 (D. Colo. 1983).
44
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143
(D.D.C. 1984). The Court stated further that
if no specific provision thereof, Defendants’ insensitivity to that
degree of decisional independence the APA affords to
administrative law judges and the injudicious use of phrases such
as “targeting,” “goals” and “behavior modification” could have
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Oversight of Government Management determined that the CDR
system and Bellmon review were mistakes,45 and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services did, in effect, admit a mistake was made
and issued a moratorium of the cessations, putting thousands of
people back on the disability roles.46
In 1981, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, then a senior staff attorney for the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), suggested a
test of the Corps concept.47 Administrative law judges from
seventeen selected “regulatory” agencies would comprise a separate
corps for five years. Anticipated efficiencies would likely “mute any
opposition . . . since adjudication is not as central to the missions of
most of these agencies as it is to the others.”48 He also suggested that
tended to corrupt the ability of administrative law judges to
exercise that independence in the vital cases that they decide.
However, defendants appear to have shifted their focus, obviating
the need for any injunctive relief or restructuring of the agency at
this time. While it is incumbent upon the agency to reexamine
the role and function of the Appeals Council and its relationship
to the ALJs in light of this litigation, it would be unsuitable for
the Court to order any affirmative relief under the present
circumstances. Plaintiff has achieved considerable success in its
valid attempt to reveal and change agency practices.
Id.
45

Oversight of Social Security Disability Benefits Terminations: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong. (1982).
46
See Social Security in Review, Public Statements by Secretary Schweiker
and Commissioner Svahn, 45 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1 (1982); Social Security Disability
Reviews: the Human Cost, Joint Hearing Before the Special Committee on Aging,
98th Cong. (1984). Several states acted independently to end the review at the state
agency level. New York State Social Services Commissioner Cesar Perales
ordered that no disabled New Yorkers be removed from the disability rolls until the
federal government promulgates “appropriate” medical standards for assessing
whose benefits should be discontinued. Several others soon followed.
47
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at
the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 275 (1981).
48
Id. at 276. Actually, some agencies rarely use rulemaking but rely almost
exclusively on adjudication to create precedent. An agency may establish binding
policy through rulemaking procedures by which it promulgates substantive rules, or
through adjudications, which constitute binding precedents. Fed. Power Comm’n
v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39–41 (1964); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
202–03 (1947). In those cases, the threshold issue is whether it would have been
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the entire corps of ALJs could be centralized into separate panels of
specialization. Although it was discussed, Congress did not adopt the
proposal.
The ABA adopted policy continuing to support the independence
and integrity of the administrative judiciary in 1983, 1989, 1998,
2000 and 2001. ABA policy supports both a Corps and a Conference
concept, effective in August 2005.49 In August 1986, the President of
the American Bar Association presented an award to the Social
Security Administrative Law Judge “corps,” which was received by
the Association of Administrative Law Judges on their behalf:
For its outstanding efforts during the period from
1982–1984 to protect the integrity of Administrative
Adjudication within their agency to preserve the
public’s confidence in the fairness of governmental
institutions and to uphold the rule of law.50
The award was given in recognition of the Association’s efforts in
redressing the wrongs of the CDI program and opposing efforts of
the agency to set numerical quotas and instituting measures to
attempt to force certain judges to reduce allowance rates.51

possible for a reasonable jury to reach the agency’s conclusion in a case heard on
the record. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300
(1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
49
The resolution states:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association encourages
Congress to establish the Administrative Law Judge Conference
of the United States as an independent agency to assume the
responsibility of the United States Office of Personnel
Management with respect to Administrative Law Judges,
including their testing, selection, and appointment.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION 1 (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/administrative_
law_judiciary/resolution_106a.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2013)
(adopted by the House of Delegates on August 8–9, 2005).
50
See American Bar Association Award (Aug. 11, 1986), presented at the
American Bar Association’s annual dinner in Lincoln Center, New York City.
51
Bono, supra note 39, at 237–38.
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In 1983, Senate Bill 1275 included language that would have
provided that one circuit court would hear all administrative
appeals.52 However, due to practical issues, and to keep the
proposals as bipartisan as possible, concepts such as a Social Security
court or a single circuit to hear all administrative cases were
removed. An effort was made to ensure that legislation would
promote efficiency and would save the government enough to make
it palatable to a majority.
Although Social Security tried to restrict judicial independence,
most other agencies had no such problem, and academics noted that
administrative law judges needed to be insulated from agency
pressure.53
Courts noted analogies to their own judicial
independence. In Butz, the Supreme Court stated: “There can be
little doubt that the role of the modern federal . . . [ALJ] . . . is
‘functionally comparable to that of a judge.’”54 Nash v. Califano
compared SSA administrative law judges to Article III judges.55
In scoring the 1989 version of the Corps Bill, estimates from the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicated that potential savings

52

See Paul N. Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies—Odyssey of
an Administrative Law Judge, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 217 (1975). Pfeiffer was a
member of the Civil Service Commission study group on the effectiveness of
administrative law judges. See id. at 217.
53
E.G. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 456–57, 499–500
(1986). The authors advocated the same independence for administrative law
judges as that of Article III judges because: “without prophylactic protection of
adjudicatory independence, the Constitution’s majestic guarantee of due process of
law may in reality be no more than a deceptive facade.” Id. at 505.
54
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). Butz involved a futures
commission merchant who brought an action against the Department of Agriculture
and others seeking damages on ground that defendants had wrongfully initiated
administrative proceedings against merchant and his company. Id. at 480–81.
Justice White held that administrative law judges are entitled to absolute immunity
from damages liability for their judicial acts. Id. at 508–14.
55
613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980). My position is that we are, indeed, like all
other trial judges . . . and more. Whereas a trial judge’s responsibility is to conduct
trials before juries that determine the facts of a dispute, ALJs must determine both
fact and law. And moreover, we must articulate legitimate reasons for each fact
that we decide. Lengthy decision writing is typically the job of appellate judges,
not trial judges. See Daniel F. Solomon, Crafting ‘Substantial’ ALJ Decisions, 43
JUDGES J. 23 (2004).
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could have been as high as $20 million annually.56 It was envisioned
that in Washington, D.C. alone, consolidation of twenty-nine separate
docketing offices would produce immense savings.57 Pooling of
administrative staff, receptionists, docketing clerks and libraries
would allow reduction of the support staff and could yield an
estimated additional $10 to $15 million annually.58 Consolidation of
physical facilities and resources would also result in a more efficient
and economical operation of the administrative hearing process.
Many law libraries and hearing rooms maintained for various
agencies throughout the District of Columbia would no longer have
been required. Many hearings require travel as much as several
weeks each month to conduct proceedings at remote hearing
locations, and it was anticipated that the costs of travel could have
been reduced.59 Finally, efficiency could also have been achieved by
the unification or reconciliation of the nearly 280 different procedural
and evidentiary rules currently used in departmental and agency
adjudications.60
Seven divisions within the Corps would be
maintained:
1. Division of Communications, Public Utility and
Transportation Regulations;
2. Division of Safety and Environmental Regulation;
3. Division of Labor;
4. Division of Labor Relations;
5. Division of Health and Benefits Programs;
6. Division of Securities, Commodities, and Trade
Regulation; and
7. Division of General Programs and Grants.61
In 1992 hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee,
Representatives of the ABA, the Federal Administrative Law Judges’
56

Murphy Remarks, supra note 30.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. Murphy also noted that securing hearing rooms was often troublesome,
and some hearings had to have been conducted in hotel rooms. Id.
61
The 1993, 103d Congress versions referred to eight divisions, covering the
same topics.
57
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Conference, and the Association of Administrative Law Judges
testified for the Corps Bill. Representatives from the Forum of the
United States Administrative Law Judges (FORUM) and the
Department of Justice testified in opposition.62 In 1993, the House
and Senate bills were introduced simultaneously.63 SSA, the
Department of Labor, and Department of Transportation filed official
objections. SSA argued that the primary impact of the bill would
have been on the Department of Health and Human Services, which
then encompassed SSA, as it employed more than seventy percent of
all administrative law judges:
A separate ALJ corps is inconsistent with the concept
of administrative decisionmaking. The authority for
ALJs to make decisions in hearing cases is delegated
to ALJs because the Secretary cannot personally hear
and decide the cases. Under the delegation, the ALJ
acts on behalf of the Secretary, applying the
Secretary's policies (as established through rules and
regulations) to the individual fact situation in a
particular case. The ALJ does not, however, establish
or create new policy. The SSA ALJ's decision
generally represents the final decision of the Secretary
in a case (unless action is taken by the Appeals
Council). If the claimant disagrees with that final
decision, he may file a civil action, and the
Department of Justice defends the Secretary's final
decision. Thus, it would be inappropriate for an ALJ
corps totally outside this Department to have the final

62

Administrative Law Judge Charles N. Bono testified for the ABA;
Administrative Law Judge Melford O. Cleveland testified on behalf of the
Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. (AALJ); Administrative Law
Judge Victor Palmer testified on behalf of the Federal Administrative Law Judges
Conference (FALJC). Administrative Law Judge Bruce Birchman testified in
opposition for the Forum of the United States Administrative Law Judges
(FORUM). FORUM had been organized by an indefinite number of administrative
law judges, and probably represented less than five percent of all administrative
law judges at the time. Judge Birchman would not divulge number of members or
provide the membership roster. ACUS was conspicuously absent.
63
H.R. 2586, 103d Cong. & S. 486, 103d Cong. (1993).
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responsibility for making administrative decisions for
the Secretary.64
Internally within SSA, continuing ongoing discussions centered on
how to replace administrative law judges.65
Meanwhile, Congress was mulling over the Corps concept. On
May 21, 1991, the National Conference of Administrative Law
Judges (NCALJ) and Judicial Division of the ABA wrote to OPM,
pointing out that despite a mandate to do so, OPM had not taken a
leadership role in the education of ALJs or the agencies as to the
nature of their relationship, the judge’s function, or in the supervision
or investigation of problems related to that relationship and function.
OPM had not conducted or sponsored orientation programs for ALJs
or their administrators; had not monitored the appointment of
sufficient numbers of ALJs by agencies (although traditionally it
carefully monitored appointments to prevent the appointment of too
many); had not adopted or proposed uniform rules for conduct or
procedure; had not determined how judges should handle continuing
legal, let alone, judicial education; had not addressed how to handle
support staff, office or hearing space; and had not investigated or
made recommendations on any of these questions. It also had never
addressed the long-standing strife between the Social Security
Administration and its administrative law judges, among other
judicial independence issues.

64

CONG. REC., S16566 (daily ed. November 19, 1993).
Bono, supra note 39. In 1973, SSA acquired the state disability program,
now known as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Judges who
heard these cases were not considered to have been APA judges until 1976. See
Pub. L. No. 95–216, tit. III, § 371, 91 Stat. 1559. See also SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC.
OF THE HOUSE COMM. WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER (Comm. Print 1979).
Actually, as described by Bono, SSA had discussed replacing ALJs openly. In
“Meet the Candid Bureaucrat,” Federal Times, July 16, 1976, James B. Cardwell,
then Commissioner of Social Security, said that he would just as soon do away
with administrative law judges in the hearings and appeals process. He complained
that they were too unpredictable and had too many “judicial trappings,” that the
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, now SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review (ODAR), had strayed too far from the parental unit. He expressed a desire
to replace them with pre-APA presiding officers who would be more in tune with
“agency policy.”
65
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In Recommendation 92-7 of the 1992 Administrative Conference
of the United States, the Federal Administrative Judiciary determined
not to address proposals for an independent corps of ALJs.66

66

Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference
Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759; 61,760–
65 (Dec. 29, 1992). “Congress should not at this time make structural changes
more extensive than those proposed here, such as those in recent legislative
proposals to establish a centralized corps of ALJs.” 57 Fed. Reg. 61,760.
Among recommendations: (1) ALJs be appointed from a broader list of
qualified applicants so as to include more women and minorities; (2) provision be
made for peer review of ALJ performance; (3) some administrative judges (AJs) be
converted to administrative law judges. See id. The ACUS investigation was
performed by Professors Paul Verkuil, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Daniel Gifford, Charles
Koch, and Richard Pierce.
As an aside, Lubbers later wrote that the ACUS recommendations
did not sit well with certain members of the ALJ community—
especially those that were pushing the centralized corps proposal.
With a change in OPM leadership and some vocal opponents
among ALJs, the ACUS recommendations died on the vine.
Afterwards, several outspoken opponents bitterly criticized
ACUS in correspondence with Congress, while other ALJs
strongly defended the agency. An objective observer who wrote
a post-mortem on ACUS found that there was at least some
evidence that this campaign on the part of some ALJs to discredit
ACUS, aided by a hired lobbyist, had some impact on its ultimate
defunding.
Jeffrey Lubbers, Paul Verkuil’s Projects for the Administrative Conference of the
U.S.: 1974–1992, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2421, 2441 (2011) (citing Toni M. Fine, A
Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19, 58–61 (1998)). Ms. Fine was apparently supplied the
“objective” evidence during a symposium entitled, “Administrative Conference of
the United States (‘ACUS’).” However, there is no mention of the “Contract for
America,” written by Larry Hunter, who was aided by House members Newt
Gingrich, Robert Walker, Richard Armey, Bill Paxon, Tom DeLay, John Boehner
and Jim Nussle, and in part using text from the 1985 State of the Union Address,
the Contract detailed the actions to take if they became the majority. Many of the
Contract’s policy ideas originated at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think
tank. Among those was to retire “unneeded” agencies. ACUS became one of
them.
At the same time, the Clinton Administration was “reinventing
government.”
A similar organization, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, which gave recommendations and advice, was also
defunded. In fact, during the debate on ACUS, former Congressman George
Gekas, seen as the “godfather” to administrative law judges, who sponsored much
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of the legislation favorable to administrative law judges, also favored funding
ACUS, contrary to the implications applied by Lubbers and Fine. The opposition
to ACUS was expressed by Ernest Istook, R. Oklahoma:
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this motion. The motion
simply asks the conferees to consistently uphold the position
already taken by this House in defunding several small agencies
that provide services which duplicate those that are or could be
performed elsewhere within the Government.
For example, regarding the Administrative Conference, their
oversight function is basically to help other agencies to
coordinate. That function dealing with Federal regulations and
administrative oversight can be performed within the Department
of Justice. It can be performed within the Office of Management
and Budget which has subdivisions for an Office of General
Management and also an Office for Informational and Regulatory
Affairs.
This is a case of duplication of services, Mr. Speaker, and if
we are serious about trying to restrict the amount of Federal
spending to bring down the Federal Government to size, if on the
one hand we have responded favorably to the Government reinvention initiatives of the Clinton administration and Vice
President Gore, then to be consistent we have to vote that way.
When we have Federal agencies that provide duplicative
efforts, then we need to do away with those agencies and roll
them up into the others that are doing the same job or can do the
same job without extra personnel, without extra rent, without
extra fringe benefits, without extra personnel policies, without
extra budgets.
The dollar amount here is fairly small, Mr. Speaker, in the
scope of the national budget. It is $7 million, but it is important
to inform the public whether or not we are serious about
downsizing the Federal Government. If we are serious, we
should vote the same way that we already voted previously in
this House, in favor of this motion to instruct conferees. If we
vote any other way, we are backing down. We are sending a
message to the taxpayers around the country that we did not
mean it when we said that we wanted to save their money and be
more economical.
Appointment of Conferees on H.R. 2403, Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1994, 139 CONG. REC. 20563 (1993). I am
advised by Professor Lubbers that the ACUS budget was actually $2 million.
I personally believe that whereas ACUS considered that the application of
“veterans’ preference to the ALJ selection process has had a materially negative
effect on the potential quality of the federal administrative judiciary,” objections to
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The Corps Bill passed through the Senate in 1993, but was not
sent to conference. In the 104th Congress, co-sponsors of the Corps
Bill included key Democratic sponsor, Howell Heflin, of Alabama,
and Republican senators, such as Strom Thurmond, Richard S.
Shelby, Hank Brown, William Cohen, and Arlen Specter.
Although the Corps concept was accepted by both houses of
Congress, it was not accepted simultaneously. During a last ditch
effort from 1993 to 1994, many of the provisions were diluted. The
question of judicial impartiality no longer seemed as important to
Congress as it had been initially, and attempts at compromise failed.
With the passage of time, it became clear that dissention among
administrative law judges defeated the Corps Bill. A small minority
of administrative law judges objected, publicly contending that there
would be a loss of expertise, alleged savings would be ephemeral,
and that the proposed bill would shift political pressure to
Congress.67
Historically there had been a distinction between judges who
were paid at the GS-16 scale and those, mostly at SSA, at the GS-15
scale, in the General Schedule.68 The inference was that “regulatory”
administrative law judges heard more complicated cases and, as
inference upon that, the judges were more worthy. Congress leveled
the potential corps when the current pay system was established by
the Federal Employee Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA).69 In
private, the main reason for objection by GS-16 judges was that they
resented that the former GS-15 judges had been “elevated,” and
wanted a return to a hierarchy—they craved public notice that they
were in superior status.
By 1993, several concessions to SSA had been added to the
language of the Corps Bill. Some members of ACUS who did not
accept that administrative law judges were “judges” who should have

ACUS from veterans’ groups had more influence on Congress than all other groups
involved.
67
See John Holmes, In Praise of the ALJ System, 21 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS,
No. 4 (1996).
68
Until 1975, some SSI judges were paid at the GS-14 scale, but were granted
full APA status in 1976.
69
FEPCA was enacted as Section 529 of the Treasury, Postal Service and
General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1389
(1990).
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any decisional independence, as well as some administrators at SSA,
argued for an “efficiency of the service” standard for administrative
law judges in SSA, to amend Section 11 of the APA, as the basis for
discipline or removal. After negotiations, as a matter of compromise,
the latest version of the Corps Bill permitted authorization of
performance and evaluation systems, as well as efficiency
standards.70 In response to the changes, some of the same judges
who argued for passage in 1992, objected one year later.71
III. THE CONFERENCE CONCEPT
For several years, representatives of several administrative law
judge organizations, including FORUM had met to consider
modifying or revising the corps bill. The result became “The
Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States Act,”72
sponsored by former Representative George Gekas (R. Pa.), then
Chair of the Subcommittee on Administrative Law, House Judiciary
Committee. All of the objections rendered by FORUM were
addressed in the legislative intent section:
(1) in order to promote efficiency, productivity,
and the improvement of administrative functions, to
enhance public service and public trust in the
administrative resolution of disputes, and to enhance
the enforcement of the administrative law provisions
of title 5, United States Code, the Administrative Law
Judge Conference of the United States should be
established;
(2) the existing system of permanent agency
assignments of administrative law judges appointed
under section 3015 of title 5, United States Code, will
be enhanced, by creating the Administrative Law

70

See S. 486, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
See Charles N. Bono, The Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law
Judge at the Office of Hearings and Appeals in the Social Security Administration,
15 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 213, 238–39 (1995).
72
Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States Act, H.R. 3961,
105th Cong. (1998) (enacted).
71
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Judge Conference of the United States and will serve
the public with maximum economy and efficiency;
(3) the Administrative Law Judge Conference of
the United States will enhance legal specialization of
administrative law judges by establishing initial and
continuing education programs, after consulting with
the appropriate agency, to insure that each such judge
has the necessary training in the specialized field of
law to hear cases assigned by the agency;
(4) the Administrative Law Judge Conference of
the United States will establish a system of
administrative law judge professional accountability
and implement a process to protect the public by
establishing procedures to handle allegations of
judicial misconduct; and
(5) the Administrative Law Judge Conference of
the United States will effect no change in the
rulemaking, interpretative, or policymaking authority
of an agency which would retain full authority to
review and change administrative law judge
decisions.73
From 1998 to 2004, agencies were generally unable to hire new
judges from the OPM register. A second version of the Conference
Bill was introduced in 2000, also sponsored by Representative
Gekas.74
Meanwhile, there were attacks to OPM’s management of the
Register. Applicants for the administrative law judge position
challenged the scoring formula OPM used in 1996 to evaluate
candidates for the position of administrative law judge. They alleged
that the policy violated OPM’s regulations and the Veterans’
Preference Act. While that case, generally known as Azdell,75 was
pending, OPM suspended the examination process for administrative
law judges. Therefore, the ALJ register became dated with one

73

Id.
See H.R. 5177, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
75
Ultimately, known as Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
74
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exception: agencies could not hire judges from the ALJ register
during this period.76 In Bush v. Office of Personnel Management,77
after an applicant was rejected in his request to be given part of the
ALJ examination, the Federal Circuit determined that the suspension
of testing was a reviewable employment practice.78 On February 27,
2004, the United States Supreme Court finally dismissed the requests
for certiorari.
Since 2000, neither a Corps Bill nor a Conference Bill has been
offered. As of the date of writing, all administrative law judge
organizations continue to support the Conference concept, as well as
the ABA and the Federal Bar Association. However, there have been
no further discussions in Congress.

76

In 1997, the Azdell/Meeker lawsuit was filed, with disadvantaged plaintiffs
asking that the 1996 rescoring process be overturned. After many appeals, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals eventually upheld OPM’s original rescoring
process in 2003. Through most of the litigation, the ALJ register was suspended,
and no hirings were allowed. However, in August 2002, SSA was granted a waiver
by OPM to hire 126 judges who would have qualified under any scoring formula.
See Challenges Facing the New Commissioner of Social Security: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong.
(2002),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG107hhrg83375/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg83375.pdf.
77
315 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
78
American Bar Association policy established that with respect to the
recruitment and selection of ALJs employed by federal agencies, OPM and
Congress, where necessary, were to develop strategies to increase the percentages
of women and minority candidates, eliminate veterans’ preferences from this
process, allow selection by agencies from a broader range of candidates for ALJ
positions, and enhance OPM’s Office of Administrative Law Judges. Although
OPM facially adhered to these requests, it failed to administer the system during
the period when it was involved in the Azdell litigation.
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IV. COMPARISON: CORPS VS. CONFERENCE
Corps Bill79
All judges become employees of ALJ
Corps in a new agency.

Chief Judge
Appointed by the President with consent
of the Senate.
Nominated by 5 member nominating
commission.
Sends names of three candidates to
President
President can reject list and ask for
another 5-year term.

7 divisions -- each headed by a division
chief administrative law judge appointed
by the President.
5 year terms.

Conference Bill80
Judges are employees of agencies of
hire.
New agency would replace the former
OPM. Office of Administrative Law
Judges.81
Chief Judge
Appointed by the President with
consent of the Senate.
Must have served as an administrative
law judge for at least 5 years
immediately before the date of
appointment.
5-year term.
Paid at the rate of 105 percent of
basic pay for level IV of the
Executive Schedule.
Judges remain with their agencies.82
The chief administrative law judge of
each agency shall be appointed by the
agency head.

79

References are to the Reorganization of the Federal Administrative Judiciary
Act, S. 486, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted).
80
References are to the Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United
States Act, H.R. 5177, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
81
“All functions of the Office of Personnel Management with respect to
administrative law judges are transferred to the Conference.” Administrative Law
Judge Conference of the United States Act, H.R. 5177, 106th Cong. (2000).
82
It is stated:
After selection for appointment to the position of administrative
law judge by an agency, the administrative law judge shall be
assigned by the chief judge to such agency for the adjudication of
cases for the agency. Each administrative law judge appointed at
the time of the date of enactment of this section shall be assigned
to the agency the administrative law judge was assigned to at the
time of the date of enactment of this section. Subsequent
assignments of the administrative law judge shall be made with
the consent of the administrative law judge and the appointing
agency.
Id.
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OPM retains primary duties.
Administrative law judges are
generalists.84
Appeals process remains intact.85

83

OPM duties assumed by the
Conference.83
Administrative law judges remain
specialists.
Appeals process remains intact.

The Conference Bill provided:
There shall be transferred to the Administrative Law Judge
Conference of the United States established under section 598 of
title 5, United States Code, the personnel, property, unexpended
balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds employed
and held by the Office of Personnel Management and relating to
the administrative law function administered by the Office of
Personnel Management.
Appropriations, authorizations,
allocations, and other funds paid or transferred by agencies to the
Office of Personnel Management for the administration of the
administrative law judge function shall, after the date of the
enactment of this Act, be paid or transferred to the Conference.

Id. at 8–9.
84
The Corps Bill stated:
An administrative law judge who is a member of the Corps shall
hear and render a decision upon—
(1) every case of adjudication subject to the provisions of
section 553, 554, or 556; (2) every case in which hearings are
required by law to be held in accordance with sections 553, 554,
or section 556; (3) every other case referred to the Corps by an
agency in which a determination is to be made on the record after
an opportunity for a hearing; and (4) every case referred to the
Corps by a court for an administrative law judge to act as a
special master or to otherwise making findings of fact on behalf
of the referring court, which shall continue to have exclusive and
undiminished jurisdiction over the case.
S. 486, 104th Cong., at 14 (1995).
85
The Corps Bill further provided:
The provisions of this subchapter shall effect no change in—
(1) an agency’s rulemaking, interpretative, or policymaking
authority in carrying out the statutory responsibilities vested in
the agency or agency head;
(2) the adjudicatory authority of administrative law judges; or
(3) the authority of an agency to review decisions of
administrative law judges under any applicable provision of law.

79
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However, studies of the entire appeals
process is mandated.86 A report after two
years is required.
Corps budget assumes all expenses for
individual judges.

Collective bargaining agreements and
other contracts remain in effect.
Judicial Council
Power similar to agency authority.88
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Conference has a budget but each
agency responsible for all budget,
resources and support requirements
on a per capita basis.87
Collective bargaining agreements and
other contracts remain in effect.
MSPB system remains,90 but a

Id. at 15–16.
86
The studies were to conform with the following:
The chief administrative law judge of the Administrative Law Judge
Corps of the United States shall conduct a study of the various types and
levels of agency review to which decisions of administrative law judges
are subject. A separate study shall be conducted for each division of the
Corps. The studies shall include monitoring and evaluating data and shall
be conducted in consultation with the division chief judges, the Chairman
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, and the agencies
that review the decisions of administrative law judges.
Id. at 24–25.
87
In the 2000 version of the Conference Bill, $5,000,000 was to have been
appropriated. H.R. 5177, 106th Cong., at 8 (2000).
88
The Corps Bill stated:
(1) to assign judges to divisions and transfer or reassign judges
from one division to another, subject to the provisions of section
599c;
(2) to appoint persons as administrative law judges under section
599c;
(3) to file charges seeking adverse action against an
administrative law judge under section 599e;
(4) to prescribe, after providing an opportunity for notice and
comment, the rules of practice and procedure for the conduct of
proceedings before the Corps, except that, with respect to a
category of proceedings adjudicated by an agency before the
effective date of the Reorganization of the Federal
Administrative Judiciary Act, the Council may not amend or
revise the rules of practice and procedure prescribed by that
agency during the 2 years following such effective date without
the approval of that agency, and any amendments or revisions
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Hears discipline cases – replaces
MSPB
Removal, suspension, reprimand
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voluntary alternative dispute
resolution process would be created
that shall be conducted at the request

made to such rules shall not affect or be applied to any pending
action;
(5) to issue such rules and regulations as may be appropriate for
the efficient conduct of the business of the Corps and the
implementation of this subchapter, including the assignment of
cases to administrative law judges;
(6) subject to the civil service and classification laws and
regulations–
(A) to select, appoint, employ, and fix the compensation of
the employees (other than administrative law judges) that the
Council deems necessary to carry out the functions, powers,
and duties of the Corps; and
(B) to prescribe the authority and duties of such employees;
(7) to establish, abolish, alter, consolidate, and maintain such
regional, district, and other field offices as are necessary to carry
out the functions, powers, and duties of the Corps and to assign
and reassign employees to such field offices;
(8) to procure temporary and intermittent services under section
3109;
(9) to enter into, to the extent or in such amounts as are
authorized in appropriation Acts, without regard to section 3709
of the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C. § 5),
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions
that may be necessary to conduct the business of the Corps;
(10) to delegate any of the chief judge’s functions or powers with
the consent of the chief judge, or whenever the office of such
chief judge is vacant, to one or more division chief judges or
other employees of the Corps, and to authorize the redelegation
of any of those functions or powers;
(11) to establish, after consulting with an agency, initial and
continuing educational programs to assure that each
administrative law judge assigned to hear cases of that agency
has the necessary training in the specialized field of law of that
agency;
(12) to make suitable arrangements for continuing education and
training of other employees of the Corps, so that the level of
expertise in the divisions of the Corps will be maintained and
enhanced; and
(13) to determine all other matters of general policy of the Corps.
Id. at 9–12.
90
“An administrative law judge may not be removed, suspended, reprimanded,
or disciplined except as provided in section 7521.” H.R. 5177, at 7.
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on grounds:
Incompetence
Neglect of duties
Misconduct
Physical or mental disability
Concurrent peer review system and a
“Complaints Resolution Board”
established comprised of judges and 16
attorneys.89
Rules of practice can be prescribed by
Council after two years.
During first two years agency rules in
use
Additional jurisdiction:
Agency and court referral:
With agency approval, courts are
authorized to refer cases, “or portions
thereof,”92 to act as a special master to
make findings of fact subject to de novo
review by the referring court. 93
Special Functions of Chief Judge:



“[T]raining of judges in more
than one subject area;



[E]mployment information
technology . . . [for] case

89

33-1

of the administrative law judge.
Emphasis added.91

No mention of rules of practice.
However, Chief Judge can initiate
rules and procedures to implement the
functions of the Conference.
Additional jurisdiction:
Court referral:
With agency approval, courts are
authorized to refer cases, “or portions
thereof,” to act as a special master to
make findings of fact subject to de
novo review by the referring court.94

The Corps Bill mentioned:
Under regulations issued by the Council, a Complaints
Resolution Board shall be established within the Corps to
consider and to recommend appropriate action to be taken when a
complaint is made concerning conduct of a judge of the Corps.
Such complaint may be made by any interested person, including
parties, practitioners, the chief judge, administrative law judges,
and agencies.

S. 486, 104th Cong., at 17–18 (1995).
91
The 1998 version of the Conference Bill established a peer review system.
92
S. 486, at 15.
93
The court shall provide for reimbursement to the agency involved for costs
relating to the administrative law judge referral.
94
The court shall provide for reimbursement to the agency involved for costs
relating to the administrative law judge referral.
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docketing, and research;



[C]onsolidating hearing
facilities and law libraries; and



[P]rograms and practices to
foster overall efficient use of
staff, personnel, equipment, and
facilities.”95

Issues an annual written report to the
President and the Congress.

V. ONGOING QUEST VIA OPM
As set forth above, the APA contemplated that the Civil Service
Commission (now OPM)96 would oversee merit selection and
appointment of ALJs and would also act as an ombudsman for the
ALJ program, but OPM has essentially abandoned that role. Section
1305 provides that, for the purpose of Sections 3105 (appointment),
3344 (loans), and 5372 (pay), OPM “may . . . investigate, prescribe
regulations, appoint advisory committees as necessary, recommend
legislation, subpoena witnesses and records, and pay witness fees.”97
Although the OPM Program Handbook affirms those responsibilities,
OPM has seldom exercised them, except for prescribing regulations,
including sometimes less-than-benign changes in selection and
Reduction in Force regulations.98 Judges are selected through a
special process, which provides for a register of qualified applicants
overseen by OPM. Judges’ pay is set by statute and OPM
regulations. Any attempt by an agency to discipline or remove a
judge requires a formal hearing by the Merit Systems Protection
Board. Judges are also exempt from the performance appraisal
requirements applicable to almost all other Federal employees under
the Civil Service Reform Act.
95

S. 486, at 5–6.
Administration of the ALJ program was originally placed in the Civil
Service Commission and was subsequently bifurcated to the OPM and the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
97
5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006).
98
See Appointment, Pay, and Removal of Administrative Law Judges, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8,874 (proposed Feb. 23, 1998).
96
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The APA attempted to bring uniformity to a field full of variation
and diversity.99 This variation is especially true since the APA
permits some agencies to borrow administrative law judges to hold
hearings.100 Parties have a right to know what the rules will be, and
in the current state, there is confusion. The 1992 ACUS proposal
supported the use of practice rules.101
A. Qualifications of Applicants to Administrative Law Judge
Register
Historically, OPM developed the criteria for judicial selection,
accepted applications and rated them on the basis of experience as
described in (1) a lengthy statement prepared by the applicant, (2) a
personal reference inquiry, (3) a written demonstration of decisionwriting ability, and (4) a panel interview. The scores from this
process determined an applicant’s rank on the Register. OPM rated
and ranked candidates on a scale from 70 to 100. When an agency
needed to fill a vacancy, OPM certified the top three ranked
applicants on the register to that agency. Also historically, only
applicants with scores from 85 to 100 were certified.102
OPM issued a final rule in March 2007 eliminating OPM
Examination Announcement No. 318—the rule instructed applicants
to apply during a fixed time period, and all applicants were screened
by the administration of (1) a written examination, (2) an
interviewing process, and (3) a scoring of qualifications. However, it
has since opened the Register to a haphazard “race to the mailbox”
method; otherwise qualified applicants are summarily rejected. OPM
has arbitrarily rejected applicants for the ALJ Register on several
occasions. For example, Vacancy Announcement No. 2008ALJ
134575, issued on July 30, 2008, limited applicants to the first six

99

5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2006).
At my agency, judges hear approximately eighty different types of cases,
with differing time lines and procedures.
101
See 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1993). “To ensure that ALJs and affected persons
are aware of their responsibilities, agencies should articulate their policies through
rules of general applicability, a system of precedential decisions, or other
appropriate practices.” Id.
102
Application of the Veterans’ Preference Act can provide an extra five
points; disabled veterans can receive an extra ten points in their scores.
100
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hundred. Although the applications were supposedly open until
August 13, 2008, applications were closed within eighteen hours, on
July 31st.
OPM develops an ALJ Register of qualified applicants to submit
to the agencies who certify a need to hire administrative law judges.
Historically, many applicants were former or sitting state judges, as
well as former military judges and state administrative law judges.103
Some have been Federal magistrates. However, some applicants who
are in judicial status in their home states are deemed unqualified if
they are not “active” lawyers. ABA policy supports using prior
judicial experience as a factor.104 It is important to ensure that the
federal government can attract highly qualified candidates for the
administrative law judge position, and the laws, regulations, and
practices of the various state bars should be controlling in the
classification of members of the judiciary, whether administrative or
otherwise.
Although OPM is required to provide hiring agencies a list of the
three best qualified applicants, ACUS recommended that a hiring
agency should be permitted to select any applicant from the
certificate who, in the agency’s opinion, possesses the qualifications
for the particular position to be filled, and an agency may request that
OPM provide an additional number of names upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances.105 The main reason that ACUS made the
suggestion was because it determined that veterans are precluding
agencies from hiring a more diverse cadre.106

103

Social Security Administration judges included Judge Joseph Simeone, a
former justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, and Judge Tom Allen, a former
justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, among other notables. Others included at
least one former military general, an admiral and many former chief military trial
and appellate judges.
104
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb.
2009),
available
ar
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2009/midyear/re
commendations/112.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
105
1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7.
106
ACUS also stated that although there was no evidence of bias against
certain classes of litigants, it recommended further investigation, especially at SSA.
It referenced a report, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HRD-92-56,
SOCIAL SECURITY: RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN DISABILITY DECISIONS WARRANTS
FURTHER INVESTIGATION (1992), and the report, NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS
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Congress intended that trial experience should be a primary
qualification for the position. There has also been a longstanding
debate regarding whether agencies should hire candidates using a
“select criterion”—or those who have agency specific knowledge.
The current law requires trial experience and or the equivalent,
without regard to special agency knowledge. ABA policy rejects
select criterion. Accusations have been made that the current register
is filled by candidates with no trial experience, because OPM sees
itself as an agent to “customer” agencies, especially SSA, and has
stacked the register to suit agency demands.
There is absolutely no evidence that veterans are less qualified
than the general population of applicants. To the contrary, evidence
from the Azdell litigation shows that in the main, they are better
qualified.
Some chief judges of the regulatory agencies have complained to
OPM that there are no qualified candidates in the register because it
is filled by former SSA decision writers, who have no trial
experience. The ABA and other bar groups have opposed “selective
certification” because some of the candidates appear to be less
qualified to manage conflicts and marshal evidence, and also because
of the appearance of agency bias.
In a recent development, SSA has convinced OPM to accept a
“split” register so that, in essence, SSA will have its own register

TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT (Discussion Draft) (July 1992) at 93–103
(discussing gender bias issues relating to disability determinations); no evidence
had been produced, and in fact, the GAO study did not establish any proof of
discrimination, either in hiring or in decision making.
Professor Lubbers advised me that ACUS did show (through statistics) that
veterans’ preference was hampering the selection of women, but ACUS also
suggested allowing agencies to choose anyone from the top 50% of the register
because it felt that agencies should be afforded more flexibility in choosing
eligibles with the background they needed for their ALJs. Lubbers stated: “You
don’t really address the main reason for ACUS’s proposed changes in ALJ
selection—the fact that agencies were (and still are) circumventing the register by
hiring laterally from SSA.”
However, as stated, at about the same time, GAO investigated complaints of
bias and discrimination at then OHA. It never made a finding, and did not publish
the study. From this, I assume that no bias or discrimination was proven.
I do not have the statistics, but anecdotally, I will testify that at my agency, and
at many others, the veterans hired include a large percentage of women, most of
whom were JAG officers and judicial officers.
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comprised of candidates who have only agency decision writing
experience, and the other agencies will have a register comprised of
candidates with trial experience.
B. Active Bar Membership
Historically, none of the regulations under the APA required
active bar membership status for administrative law judges.107
Effective April 19, 2007, 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 established a
requirement that incumbent Administrative Law Judges maintain
active bar status.108
Licensure in each state is distinct. Although some states have
reciprocity for membership, some do not. Moreover, some judges
live and work in states where all lawyers and judges are required to
be members of the bar, while others are prohibited from being
members of the bar because it is considered both inappropriate and
unethical for judges to be subject to discipline by a body consisting

In fact, James R. Rucker, Jr., then SSA’s Chief Administrative Law Judge,
issued a Memorandum dated January 9, 1989, stating that OPM did not require
active bar membership after appointment. On December 13, 2005, OPM published
its initial Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (NPRM). Examining System and
Programs For Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous), 70 Fed. Reg.
73646 (Dec. 13, 2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 337 & 930). On December
21, 2005, OPM republished its NPRM “due to information that was inadvertently
omitted” from the December 13, 2005 NPRM. See Examining System and
Programs For Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous), 70 Fed. Reg.
75745 (Dec. 21, 2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 337 & 930).
108
See 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (2009).
107

In 1998 and 1999, OPM advised ALJs that they are required to
maintain active bar status to retain their status as ALJs, although
there is no provision in the OPM regulations granting authority to
do so. Unlike attorneys, ALJs are barred from the practice of law
by the Code of Judicial Conduct, which has been applied to ALJs
by the Merit Systems Protection Board (In re Chocallo, 1
MSPBR 612, 651 (1978)) and by some agency regulations. In
some states, Federal ALJs, like other judges, cannot be members
of the state bar—e.g. Alabama.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 6 n.17.
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of and controlled by practicing attorneys. Moreover many judges are
not members of the bar where they reside or where they may work.109
In many states, administrative law judges are entitled to judicial
status. In many others, there may not be a judicial category, per se,
but administrative law judges, as members of the judiciary, may be
exempt from continuing legal education.110 However, some states
prohibit judges from the active practice of law. For example,
Delaware Supreme Court Rule 69(e) provides that “Judicial
members” of the Delaware Bar are “those judges, commissioners and
masters who are disqualified from the practice of law and those
retired judges who do not practice law.”111 In addition, “judicial
members are exempt from the process of annual registration with the
Court.”112
AALJ filed suit in 2007. After the Court denied a Motion to
Dismiss, OPM agreed to modify the regulation, which it did as to full
time judges on October 7, 2010.113 However, the AALJ v. U.S. Office
of Personnel Management case has not been dismissed as of this
writing, and the case remains open.114

109

For example, I live in Maryland and, although my office is in the District of
Columbia, most of my cases are on the road; I have exposure to every state,
territory and even foreign countries. I am a member of the Pennsylvania and
Florida bars. In Pennsylvania I must register with the Prothonotary of the Supreme
Court, through the state Disciplinary Board. I am exempt from mandatory CLE
due to my judicial status. I could have waived into Maryland or the District of
Columbia, but only through my Pennsylvania qualifications, as there is no
reciprocity with Florida. Some non-resident judges are admitted in states like
Indiana, and although they may not reside there, and do not hold hearings there,
must meet a state CLE requirement.
110
State requirements are tracked in David. L. Agatstein, Active Bar
Membership, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 496 (2007).
111
See DELAWARE STATE COURTS, http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules/#supreme
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
112
Id.
113
Programs for Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous), 75
Fed. Reg. 61,998 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified 5 C.F.R. pt 930).
114
640 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
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C. Ethics
OPM has refused to consider a code of conduct for administrative
law judges.115 All administrative law judge organizations promote
high standards.116 This is consistent with case law that judges should
be held accountable under appropriate ethical standards adapted from
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.117 Although no standard
judicial codes apply by law or regulation, the Merit Systems
Protection Board has referenced the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct starting with In re Chocallo.118 The 2001 Model Code,
especially Canon 1, Rule 1.2, has been used extensively: “A judge
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”119 SSA
has recently prosecuted administrative law judges using standards

115

Professor Lubbers had asked for authority for this statement:
I personally was involved during the 1992–1993 period
when SSA tried to adopt a code. Judge Ronnie A. Yoder was the
principal author of the 1989 NCALJ Code for Administrative
Law Judges, and he, and several other members of NCALJ met
with OPM, among other entities.
I was an officer in the ABA/NCALJ when we discussed use
of the Codes as a substitute for performance evaluations during
the Bush Administration. Office of Personnel Management
Associate Director for Strategic Human Resources Policy, Ron
Sanders, was the principal OPM negotiator. For the record,
NCALJ was opposed to any “surrogate.” FORUM advocated for
the surrogate.

116

Administrative law judges should be governed by the 2009 Code of
Conduct for United States Judges, administered by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. Other Judicial groups have voluntarily sought and have
received coverage: “Certain provisions of this Code apply to special masters and
commissioners . . . . The Tax Court, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have adopted this Code.” See
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnited
StatesJudges.aspx (click on “Introduction”) (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
117
ABA DIV. FOR POLICY ADMIN., 2012–2013 ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES
HANDBOOK 193 (2012) [hereinafter “ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES”].
118
1 MSPBR 612, 651 (1978)
119
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, R. 1.2 (2007).
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that are not included in any judicial code, such as “conduct
unbecoming an administrative law judge.”120
Although OPM did not actively participate, in October 1992 the
SSA Division of Regulations and Rulings drafted and distributed a
proposed “Code of Conduct” for administrative law judges.
Although the code would probably been acceptable to all
administrative law judge organizations, concerns were raised by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and by the Office of Government Ethics
(OGE) about the proposed code at that time.121 In March 1995,
another draft was sent to be cleared for publication. It referenced the
Unified Corps Bill S. 486 (1994) and included language concerning
the efficiency of case management and extent of cooperation with
administrative directives as criteria for misconduct.122 However, it
was not published.123
D. Performance Reviews and “Discipline”
Whereas the APA specifically forbids performance standards and
reviews, in an attempt to reduce the implication of bias toward the
employing agency, ACUS recommended a system of review. It
recommended case processing guidelines, which would address

120

See, e.g., Long v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(upholding removal based on facts arising from off-duty conduct in a domestic
relations dispute); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Steverson, 2009 M.S.P.B. 143 (upholding
the removal of an administrative law judge based upon four charges including, but
not limited to, off-duty conduct unbecoming an administrative law judge, off-duty
misuse of government equipment in storing sexually-oriented material on his
government-issued computer and in maintaining a private business, and lack of
candor), aff’d, 383 F. App’x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
121
In 1993, I attended a discussion at the William and Mary Marshall-Wythe
School of Law with proponents and opponents of the proposed SSA and the
NCALJ Code. Although there were no compelling substantive objections, the
OGE general counsel objected, arguing that as administrative law judges are
“mere” employees, any code would conflict with agency responsibilities, and OGE
rules, as well as specific agency codes. At the time, SSA opposed this view.
Another complicating factor is that OPM took the position that as all judges were
members of a bar, the states’ codes would overlay the proposed codes. We
reminded them that Article III judges and most Article I judges have no such
problem.
122
Bono, supra note 39, at 243–44.
123
Id.
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issues such as “productivity and step-by-step time goals, [and] would
be one of the bases upon which Chief ALJs would conduct regular
(e.g., annual) performance reviews.”124
ACUS also recommended that judicial comportment and
demeanor would be reviewed.
Another factor on the list of bases for performance
review, which list is not intended to be exclusive,
would be the existence of a clear disregard of, or
pattern of non-adherence to, properly articulated and
disseminated rules, procedures, precedents and other
agency policy. Such performance review systems
need not involve quantitative measures or specific
performance levels, but they should provide
meaningful and useful feedback on performance.125
Since 1992, although performance reviews have not been
performed, SSA has been maintaining production guidelines.
Although administrative law judges have been removed through the
MSPB system, none have been removed for low production per se.
Almost all recent removal cases involve SSA. Ironically, at least two
of the judges removed were SSA manager-judges, Hearing Office
Chief Administrative Law Judges (HOCALJ).126 Many other
management judges have been demoted, although these are not well
documented.127

124

Recommendation 92-7, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1993).
Id.
126
Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Soc. Sec. Admin.
v. Harty, 117 F. App’x 733 (2004). Carr was removed for (1) reckless disregard
for personal safety, (2) persistent use of vulgar and profane language, (3)
demeaning comments, sexual harassment and ridicule, and (4) interference with
efficient and effective agency operations. Harty was removed for failure to
perform his assigned duties and for engaging in unprofessional and injudicious
conduct or making unprofessional or injudicious statements to agency employees.
127
In Butler v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 331 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a former
HOCALJ alleged that he was demoted in retaliation for his support of grievances
filed by other administrative law judges. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that because he did not suffer a reduction in pay or grade upon losing his
Hearing Office Chief duties, his demotion was not a “reassignment,” and therefore
125
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The accusation that SSA is obsessed with production remains. In
at least one office, thousands of disability awards were rendered
“prematurely,” ostensibly rendered to impress management. After
the HOCALJ was confronted, he allegedly committed suicide. After
an Inspector General investigation, the office supervisor was
threatened with a fine of $3.5 million, another employee has been
assessed a fine of $215,000, and two other employees were notified
that they may have been fined more than $100,000 each.128 Another
judge awarded benefits to 2,285 applicants in 2007, at a cost to
taxpayers of $2.1 billion.129
E. Peer Review
The 1992 ACUS report recommended that chief judges, either
individually or through a peer review group, receive and investigate
such complaints or allegations, and recommend appropriate
corrective or disciplinary actions. The Conference Bill would have
provided for a voluntary alternative dispute resolution process.
At my agency, advisory committees were established in 1981 to
conduct informal inquiries and to consider and recommend
appropriate action regarding complaints of misconduct or
disability.130 Apparently no other agency has a similar process.

he had no standing to protect his former position. Id. at 1373. There is no
determination how many other similar actions have occurred.
128
Stephen Barr, A Fight Over Fines for Social Security Workers, THE WASH.
POST
(Jan.
16,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011500975.html.
129
Mark Friesen, Paying Out Billions, One Judge Attracts Criticism, THE
OREGONIAN
(Dec.
29,
2008),
http://www.oregonlive.com/special/index.ssf/2008/12/paying_out_billions_one_jud
ge.html.
130
Procedures for Internal Handling of Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, 46
C.F.R. § 28050 (1981), as amended; Amended Procedures for Internal Handling of
Complaints of Misconduct or Disability, 48 C.F.R. § 30843 (1983); Office of
Administrative Law Judges, Amended Procedures for Internal Handling of
Complaints of Misconduct or Disability, 52 C.F.R. § 32973 (1987). The function
of the committee is advisory only. “Its inquiry and report in each instances shall be
confined to the specific matter referred to it and shall contain no evaluation of the
performance or qualifications of the affected judge contrary to the Administrative
Procedure Act.”
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AALJ has recommended something similar at SSA, but nothing
has been initiated. SSA has several complaint procedures, primary
due to complaints of bias,131 and does administer a program of
“counseling.” Judges have complained that the agency has fostered
some of the complaints, to scapegoat certain judges.
F. Professionalism
Although OPM should promote continuing judicial education, it
has done nothing in this area. ABA policy encourages continuing
legal education.132
Although agencies used to provide continuing legal education for
their judges, many current budgets do not permit it.
G. Chief Judges
At present, no agency chief judge is directly accountable to
Congress. Both the Corps and Conference concepts would require
Presidential appointment of a chief with Senate confirmation.
In a handful of cases, some chief judges have defended due
process, and, unfortunately, have been restrained. At SSA, the Chief
Judge position is so far down on the pecking order that, on many
occasions, decisions on how to manage the program are made
without any input from any judge.133

131

Claimants and their advocates or representatives may file a bias complaint
against a judge. “Persons may make complaints in writing to our Office of the
Chief Administrative Law Judge and to our regional and hearing offices. We also
receive complaints through our Appeals Council,” also through a telephone and
I.G. Hotlines, “and congressional offices on behalf of their constituents. We
review, investigate, and respond to such complaints.” 75 Fed. Reg., 35, at 8171–76
(Feb. 23, 2010).
132
ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES, supra note 117, at 268.
133
The chief judge reported to the deputy associate commissioner, who
reported to the associate commissioner, who reported to the deputy commissioner
for disability, who reported to the principal deputy commissioner, who reported to
the commissioner. See JUDGE LONDON STEVERSON, CONFESSIONS OF A SOCIAL
SECURITY JUDGE 372 (2010) (“SSA’s attempt during the summer of 1999 to
discharge the Chief ALJ for reasons not related to good cause”). A proposed bill
was circulated at the height of the acrimony over HPI that would have required
presidential appointment and direct reporting authority. When members of the
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Both the Corps and Conference would require a term and
reporting authority directly to Congress.
VI. MINI-CORPS
As stated above, to promote judicial and administrative efficiency
and consistency, Professor Lubbers suggested an experiment, of
uniting seventeen similar small regulatory agencies. Combined,
these agencies might have approached the budget and manpower of a
couple of large SSA hearings offices, and at the time, SSA had over a
hundred hearing offices. None of the seventeen had been accused of
violations of section 11 of the APA, whereas judges at SSA still
maintain that SSA remains unconscionably obsessive about
“production” and indolent about “quality.” Although SSA judges
now produce far more decisions in faster time, the judges allege that
agency hostility to the rank and file remains, and that judges continue
to make convenient scapegoats for agency failures.
Although the Conference concept is still policy of the AALJ, the
union at SSA, there has been an open discussion on the feasibility of
renewing the Corps concept, or a Mini-Corps, if only for SSA. After
a 1999 Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) election, AALJ
became the exclusive representative of all full-time and part-time
non-supervisory administrative law judges. Today, SSA’s Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR) consists of the Office
of the Chief Administrative Law Judge at the top of an organizational
pyramid; four National Hearing Centers (sixty-two supervisory
judges) and ten Regional Offices (ten supervisory ALJs). Hearing
Offices, numbering 157, report to the regional chief judges, each with
its own hearing office chief judges (157 “HOCALJ” judges) and one
or more bargaining unit non-supervisory ALJs. In fiscal year 2012,
AALJ represented 1,266 bargaining unit members. Under the FLRA,
“supervisors” cannot be part of the bargaining units. However, under
a program of “re-configuration,” SSA does not permit administrative
law judges to direct or rate office employees, who are represented by
other unions.
One major impetus for unionization was the
implementation of the Hearing Process Improvement Plan (“HPI”),

House Subcommittee and staff inquired, the chief judge was barred from speaking
to them. The issue was whether SSA would retain the due process hearing.
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which was designed to minimize the role of the judge in the hearing
process.134
SSA and CMS (the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid) are the
only APA agencies that use a “non-adversarial” system.135 Initially,
both were housed within the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), formerly known as the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (“HEW”).
Subsequently, SSA was
“separated” from HHS. Until 2003, SSA administrative law judges
heard a large majority of the cases now heard by CMS.136
The major complaint about SSA disability programs is that it is
slow and that there is a backlog of cases. In the Joint Hearing on
Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog, the late Judge
Ronald A. Bernoski testified: “It is critical to understand that
currently, of the 765,000 total pending cases, over 455,000 of them,
60% of the total backlog, are waiting in the hearing offices to be
worked up for a judge to review. This is the precise location of the
blockage causing the backlog.”137
Factors Judge Bernoski also identified:


The ratio of staff to judge,

According to the agency, the plan sought to reduce “1) the high number of
hearing office staff involved in preparing a case for a hearing; 2) the ‘stove pipe’
nature of employees’ job duties; and 3) inadequate management information
necessary to monitor and track each case through the process.” Statement of
Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration before the
Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security, 112th Cong. 11–
13 (June 27, 2012). A few of the changes HPI made to hearing office organization,
such as creating the position of hearing office director, are still in place, but
Congress would not fund it. See id.
135
Under Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
Congress authorized the Social Security Administration to promulgate regulations
regarding entitlement to benefits for miners totally disabled due to coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. These regulations are codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 410, subpart D.
Part 410 applies to claims filed on or before December 31, 1973. 20 C.F.R. §
410.231. A few of these claims survive, and are “non-adversarial.”
136
SSA administrative law judges heard Medicare Part A and Part B cases,
while HHS administrative law judges heard Part C cases.
137
Joint Hearing on Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog: Before
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 2 (Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of
ALJ. Ronald G. Bernoski).
134
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Quality and composition of the staff,
State Agency Disability Determination Service (“DDS”)
allowance rates,
Quality of case development, and
Availability of worked-up cases for hearings.

Additional factors are: continued inadequate funding for Social
Security; the failure of SSA to hire adequate support staff for judges;
the failure of Social Security to manage and forecast the impact of
the baby boomers; increased case receipts during the mid-1990’s; the
failure of the agency to implement a plan to address the same; and
the failure of many of SSA’s reform initiatives.138
138

In my experience the main factors for the backlog were:
1. Failure of certain state DDS agencies to award benefits in clear cases.
Although the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has identified certain
states with a significantly higher incidence of disease than others, these
statistics are not consistent with DDS payment rates in those states, or
rates of payment at the hearings level. Some state DDS’s have been
accused of sending on meritorious claims that should have never been
sent to the hearings level. In some instances, certain DDS’s have been
accused of creating alleged conflicts in the evidence, to avoid payment,
when there is enough affirmative evidence to render a favorable decision.
For example, see the CBS Television series, Failing the Disabled, 2008–
2009.
Failing the Disabled, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500690_162-3718129.html.
“Nobody
cares if a case is denied. If you approve it, it will be subjected to intense
scrutiny,” one former DDS examiner stated. Disabled and Waiting,
CBSNEWS, (Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Trisha Cardillo). In many
states, DDS’s refuse to thoroughly develop the medical and vocational
evidence, refuse to process (or mark) documents, cull out duplicates or
develop an exhibit list to avoid having the hearing office to reconstruct
every file before evidence can be entered into the record. Failing the
Disabled, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100500690_162-3718129.html.
2. Failure of ODAR to include judges in the chain of command of the
hearing office staff. Although the staff is supposed to support the
hearings process, they are not supervised by judges who are singularly
responsible for the work product.
3. Too much time and money are devoted to development of cases that do
not involve needy claimants. For example, whereas claimants who are
not in payment status desperately wait for payment, many of the cases at
the hearing level involve disputes over onset dates for people already
receiving reduced retirement benefits, but allege disability to try to obtain
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Although SSA has been plagued with unwieldy backlogs at the
hearings level, both AALJ and the SSA Inspector General have
decried policies that encourage “paying down the backlog,” that is
paying cases to get rid of them as quickly as possible.139
AALJ, the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB),140 and many
other groups have recommended that the procedures at SSA should
be more formal. At one time, managers at SSA might have agreed.
In 1988, a draft proposal that would have provided rules of practice
and limited some issues was disclosed in a New York Times article.141
A hearing before the full House and Ways Committee was called.142
The proposed rules would have “closed the record,” and would have
limited the issues, at hearing and on appeal. Evidence would have to
be produced seven days prior to hearing. Penalties for failing to
supply evidence within the allotted time were also provided. It
provided pre-hearing conferences before staff attorneys, to limit
issues, to gather evidence. After the hearing, the proposed rules were
never published.
“full” benefits. The SSA trust fund exposure in these cases is usually
quite limited. On some occasions, such cases have been prioritized.
Others types of cases assigned to judges include SSI eligibility,
overpayment, underpayment claims and other matters involving
inconsequential amounts, all of which should have reduced priority.
139

Joint Hearing on Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog,
Committee On Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of the Hon.
Patrick O’Carroll, Inspector General, SSA).
140
In 1994, when Congress passed legislation establishing the Social Security
Administration as an independent agency, it also created a 7-member bipartisan
Advisory Board to advise the President, the Congress, and the Commissioner of
Social Security on Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
policy. Social Security Independence Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-296, 108 Stat.
141
Steven V. Roberts, Sensitive Issues Put on the Shelf To Protect Bush, NEW
YORK TIMES (Nov. 16, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/16/us/sensitiveissues-put-on-the-shelf-to-protect-bush.html (“Today, it was learned that the
Administration is preparing new rules that would restrict the rights of people to
appeal Government decisions denying them Social Security or welfare benefits.”).
142
Irvin Molotsky, Plan to Curb Benefit Appeals Is Rejected, NEW YORK
TIMES (Dec. 4, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/04/us/plan-to-curbbenefit-appeals-is-rejected.html (“The Commissioner, Dorcas R. Hardy, said in a
statement that the draft of the proposal had ‘generated inaccurate information and
caused undue alarm to the American public.’”).
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After a four-year investigation, and obtaining the advice of
experts like Professors Verkuil, Lubbers, and Frank Bloch,143 the
Social Security Advisory Board found a serious gap between
disability policy and the administrative capacity required to carry out
that policy. “There has not been a full-scale review of disability
policy and process in over 20 years. The result is a great deal of
incoherence and at times demonstrable unfairness.”144
To remedy this, the SSAB asked Congress to make a number of
changes, including initiating an adversarial system, closing the record
at hearing, and establishing rules of practice. It also asked Congress
to “rationalize” the role of the Appeals Council and to establish a
“Social Security Court” to replace review at the United States District
Courts. Professors Verkuil and Lubbers appeared before Congress
and specifically recommended closing the record.145
Subsequently, on July 27, 2005, SSA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”), which included an attempt to close
the record. Also, SSA stated that with a high percentage of claimants
represented by counsel at hearings, it recommended the use of an
agency representative to balance the interests that would, in essence,
modify the nature of the proceedings. These rules were published,
but due to pressure principally from the NOSSCR, but also
Administrative Law Section of the ABA, some were also

143

Paul Verkuil & Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review
of Social Security Disability Cases: A Report to the Social Security Advisory
Board,
STRATAGEM,
INC.
(Mar.
1,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/VerkuilLubbers.pdf. See also Paul R.
Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social
Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731 (2003); Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey
S. Lubbers, & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a
Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability
Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2003); Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
& Paul R. Verkuil, The Social Security Administration’s New Disability
Adjudication Rules: A Significant and Promising Reform, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 235
(2007).
144
Hearing on Social Security Disability Program’s Challenges and
Opportunities, H. Comm. On Ways and Means, (2001) (statement of Stanford G.
Ross, Chairman, Social Security Advisory Board).
145
Second in a Series on Social Security Disability Programs’ Challenges and
Opportunities: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the
Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002).

Spring 2013

Fundamental Fairness

99

withdrawn.146
There have been repeated suggestions that Congress should
establish an independent adjudication agency with exclusive
jurisdiction over SSA and CMS cases.147 Not only are the procedures
unique, both agencies exclusively use rulemaking proceedings to set
policy, rather than adjudication.
Two independent adjudication agencies provide adjudication of
safety and health disputes between the Department of Labor and
employers:
 The Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC),
 The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission (FMSHRC).
OSHRC determines whether safety regulations promulgated by
the Department of Labor have been violated. FMSHRC adjudicates

146

Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims,
70 Fed. Reg. 43,590 (proposed July 27, 2005). Under a Disability Service
Improvement (DSI) process, a Quick Disability Determination (QDD)
experimental process for certain types of claims was initiated where an initial
finding of disability could be made within twenty days; the creation of a Medical
and Vocational Expert System (MVES), designed to improve the quality and
availability of medical and vocational expertise throughout the administrative
process; the addition of a Federal Reviewing Official (FRO), who would review
appealed initial decisions before such decisions are scheduled for an administrative
hearing; and rules implementing the closing of the record were offered, but most
were rejected. See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial
Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006). In December 2009, SSA
announced ending the DSI program. In May, 2011, SSA issued a final rule.
Eliminating the Decision Review Board Reestablishing Uniform National
Disability Adjudication Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,802 (May 3, 2011).
147
For example, the late Judge Robin J. Arzt suggested a new agency in Robin
J. Arzt’s, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency to Make
the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267 (2003). She also suggested creation of a
“Social Security Court” to eliminate jurisdiction of the United States District
Courts. This was not the first time it had been suggested. See Paul R. Verkuil &
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security
Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, (2003) (proposing a Social Security
Court); Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security?, 15 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1987).
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violations of mining standards likewise promulgated by the
Department of Labor.148
If SSA and CMS were to be placed in an adjudication agency,
these agencies could act as models. Meanwhile, it is ironic that
although SSA and CMS were separated in 2003, they occupy
separate offices in cities such as Cleveland, Miami, and Irvine. It
very well may be that if SSA and CMS hearings offices were
consolidated, it might lead to substantial savings.
It is also apparent that some agencies, such as the NLRB and the
FLRA, have procedures and laws that may not be congruent, but
which constitute variations on the same theme. The same may be
true of the ITC and FTC, and the DOT and the NTSB. Claims heard
under the Shipping Act by the FMC are not much different than some
of the claims heard by my agency. My agency hears whistleblower
claims that may stem from alleged violations of laws and regulations
of other agencies, such as the SEC, the EPA, DOT, and the NRC
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Although these agencies, in
theory, may participate in these proceedings, they rarely do.
Therefore, perhaps Congress should consider several sets of minicorps.
VII.

UNIFORMITY OF AGENCY PROCEDURES

As stated above, some agencies believed that they were superior
to the United States circuit courts, and established “acquiescence”
policies. In general, the degree of deference accorded to the
interpretations that appellate courts review depends on whether the
interpretation is offered by a district court or by an agency.
The APA provides agency heads with broad discretion as to the
scope of review of administrative law judge decisions. “On appeal
from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers

148

As Judge Arzt stated, two agencies formed as boards have primarily
adjudicative duties:
 The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and
 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
However, these both have some powers beyond adjudication. MSPB does
studies of the civil service and recommends legislation to Congress and the
President and the NTSB investigates accidents and recommends safety
improvement measures.
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which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may
limit the issues on notice or by rule.”149 In practice, however, this
free hand has been somewhat circumscribed by reviewing courts.
Although the circuits are relatively clear in refusing to accord
deference to the district courts upon review of their statutory
interpretation decisions, the standard of review accorded agency
decisions involving interpretation represents an area of debate,
centered around the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to
decisions of law by an agency.150 According to the Chevron standard
of review, circuit courts ask:
(1) Has Congress directly spoken on the precise issue decided by
the agency;
(2) If not, is the statute silent or ambiguous on the question (was
the agency’s decision reasonable)?151
In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals used
a “clearly erroneous” standard of review of patent office (“PTO”)
cases, which generally governs appellate review of district court
findings of fact, rather than the standards set forth in the APA, which
permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by
substantial evidence.152 Justice Breyer, writing for a majority that
included Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas,
ruled that although the PTO relied on a statute that preceded the
APA, a uniform approach is required unless a clear exception
exists.153

149

5 U.S.C. § 557 (2006).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
151
Id.
152
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999).
153
Id. The Federal Circuit determined that under APA § 559, the APA does
150

not limit or repeal additional requirements . . . recognized by law.
In the Circuit’s view: (1) at the time of the APA’s adoption, in
1946, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), a
Federal Circuit predecessor, applied a court/court “clearly
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No one has performed a thorough study of agency adjudication.
From the standpoint of tracking cases, although this stage is
relatively coherent in each agency, cross-agency comparisons are
difficult due to the variety of review structures. Moreover, even
within an agency, because the review structure is normally quite
separate from the hearings office, the logistics of following cases
through both stages are problematic. In fact, even within an agency,
the standard of review may differ. At my agency, cases may be
appealed to two separate boards, the Administrative Review Board
(ARB), and the Benefits Review Board (BRB). Historically, the
agency took the position that decisions to the ARB were not final;
and therefore, the ARB was free to reweigh evidence. The BRB was
required to review cases using APA principles of review.154 Within
some agencies, there are apparent turf wars that make evaluation
difficult.155

erroneous” standard; (2) that standard was stricter than ordinary
court/agency review standards; and (3) that special tradition of
strict review consequently amounted to an “additional
requirement” that under § 559 trumps the requirements imposed
by § 706.
Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted). This rationale was rejected.
Professor Lubbers advises that he worked on the case, and
the clearly erroneous standard used by the CCPA was an
“additional requirement” that survived the enactment of the
APA—was rejected. It’s true that the CAFC’s decision based on
§ 559 of the APA was reversed (we lost), but not because the
argument itself was rejected—the Supreme Court simply found
(wrongly I think) that the clearly erroneous test had not been
consistently enough applied by the CCPA in the past to be an
established requirement.
Email from Jeffrey S. Lubbers to author (on file with author).
154
This distinction has been blurred. As on August 31, 2010, many of the
cases that formerly were recommended or proposed to the ARB became “final”
decisions.
155
When the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) examined cases
appealed under the Black Lung Benefits Act, and found a high incidence of
remands from the BRB to OALJ, the DOL Office of Administrative Law Judges
(OALJ).
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Different docket personnel are often involved at each stage and
the hearings offices usually lose track of cases after initial decisions
are issued.156 It may be that a review of each agency will disclose
that there are rules that should be added to the APA, or that can be
added in rulemaking if a Conference or Corps were created. The
ABA Judicial Division, the National Judicial College, and the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges attempted to
initiate a study of adjudication, not only within the Federal
government but also among the states. However, funding was never
accomplished and a thorough study remains unfulfilled.

Officials at DOL offered divergent opinions on why cases were
remanded. Some administrative law judges said claims are
sometimes remanded to OWCP because medical evidence
submitted by DOL’s approved doctors was incomplete and
required clarification or further development. BRB judges said
claims are commonly remanded to OALJ for reconsideration
because of certain legal deficiencies, such as errors in weighing
evidence. However, several administrative law judges said that
they believed that BRB sometimes remands claims for further
review by the administrative law judge to avoid the potential
review of a BRB decision by a United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, and others said that in their view, certain remands are
the result of BRB reweighing evidence, which is beyond the
narrow scope of BRB review. In 2007, an independent program
reviewer examined the number of OALJ remands to OWCP and
concluded that further study of the causes of remands could help
DOL identify policies and procedures that reduce this source of
delays. No study has been conducted to determine the causes of
remands by any of DOL’s adjudicators back to the prior review
stage, whether from adjudicatory bodies back to OWCP or from
BRB to OALJ, according to DOL officials.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-7, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS
PROGRAM: ADMINISTRATIVE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGED COULD IMPROVE
MINERS’ ABILITY TO PURSUE CLAIMS 16 (2009) [hereinafter GAO Report].
156
See The “Good Cause” Exemption from the APA Rulemaking
Requirements (Recommendation No. 83-2) 1 C.F.R. § 305.83-2 (1992) [hereinafter
Agency Structures].
Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of Authority Within
Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1
(1986).
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In 2002, Professor Verkuil published a study of SSA court
appeals.157 Whereas most appeals from the “regulatory” agencies are
heard by the United States Circuit Courts, district court judges and
magistrates hear SSA appeals. Using “outcomes analysis,” he
“expected” to find that courts applying the deferential substantial
evidence standard would uphold 75-85% of SSA decisions denying
benefits.158 He also expected the affirmation rate of decisions
denying disability benefits to be higher than the affirmation rate of a
class of agency decisions subject to de novo review.159 To the
contrary, he found that courts upheld less than 50% of decisions that
deny social security disability benefits and that courts reverse a much
higher proportion of disability decisions than of agency decisions that
are subject to de novo judicial review.160
Other studies have rendered quite different “expectations.” In a
1999 study that included all stages of evaluation determined that the
“first stage award rate” for new applications submitted to one of the
54 state-based DDS is only 45.9%, whereas the “ultimate award rate”
increases to 72.5%, allowing for the option to appeal or re-apply.161
In some states, that percentage is now much higher.162
Although the studies may be accurate, none relate to whether
there are differences in rates on a geographic basis, or whether there
157

Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (2002).
158
Id. at 690.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 719. See also Testimony of Richard J. Pierce, Jr. Before the Social
Security Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 112th Cong.
(2012). Pierce relies greatly on the fact that Verkuil expressed doubt that
“Congress wants [judicial] scope of review to be an irrelevant labeling exercise,”
but his findings demonstrate that it is “an irrelevant labeling exercise” in the
context of judicial review of social security disability decisions. District courts and
circuit courts routinely pay lip service to the deferential substantial evidence
standard while actually applying a standard more demanding even than de novo
review. Verkuil, supra note 157.
161
Hugo Benitez-Silva et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security
Disability Application, Appeal, and Award Process, 6 LABOUR ECONOMICS 147
(1999).
162
See Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Disability Claims Allowance Rates, Initial and Reconsideration Adjudicative Level,
Fiscal Year 2011, By Nation, Region, and State, 34 NOSSCR SOCIAL SECURITY
FORUM 16 (July 2012) [hereinafter Statistics (NOSSCR Forum)].
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are other factors to generate variances in rates at the appellate level.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has evaluated
populations by location and impairment, and these statistics are
available, but they have not been considered by any of the studies. In
reviewing DDS state agency rates at the first and second levels of
evaluation of SSA cases,163 there has not been any study that can
reconcile that in some states a claimant has a 75% chance of
receiving benefits at a stage below the hearings level, whereas in
others a claimant has less than a 30% chance at that level.164 The
high proportion of “reversals” by District and Circuit court judges,
suggests that SSA should review its litigation policy, rather than
suggest that the initial determinations require other “expectations.”165
Unlike most other adjudication, the Social Security Act precludes
settlement.166 In almost any other venue, the vast majority of claims
are settled before a decision and order is published and is subject to
appellate review. Therefore, any analogy to pure adversarial appeals
may not be valid.
Much of the increase in the rate of “reversals” is, to a reasonable
degree of probability, due to the fact that SSA claimants are
“lawyered up.” According to Social Security, by 1993, claimants
requested a hearing in about 75% of all reconsideration denials. The
claimant typically retained an attorney for assistance in the appeal

163

The initial and reconsideration steps.
See Statistics (NOSSCR Forum), supra note 162.
165
Professor Lubbers advises me that the Verkuil study did compare SSA
cases to “a class of cases subject to de novo review,” but I think it should be
mentioned that those latter cases were FOIA decisions by agencies—where the
government seems to get extra deference despite the statutory scope-of-review
standard.
166
Another exception was discussed in Ramey v. Dir., Office of Workers’
Comp. Program, 326 F.3d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 2003), where settlements in Black
Lung cases were also barred. Although the miner and the coal operator wanted to
settle, the Court relied on a DOL interpretation of its own statute to reject
settlement. Id. at 476–78. A subsequent GAO report suggested that DOL study the
costs and benefits of allowing compensation for partial disability and settlement of
claims. See GAO Report, supra note 155. In most Black Lung cases, both the
miner and coal operator are usually represented. Another factor may be that in
many recent cases, the Black Lung Trust Fund has paid interim benefits to the
miner.
164
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process.167 Apparently, since then, representation has increased. It is
reasonable to expect that good representation should skew the
expectations.168
There is also no mention in the studies that the case law among
the circuits may vary. If that is important, as stated above, in 1983,
primarily as a remedy for “non-acquiescence,” Senate Bill 1275
included language that would have provided for all administrative
appeals to be heard by one Circuit Court.169 It has yet to be studied
whether or not this would result in cost savings.
It is also apparent that these studies have not considered the
history of appeals in agencies other than SSA. When ACUS
evaluated the SSA Appeals Council, it determined that it “added
nothing of value” to the process.170 Professor Lubbers and the late
Judge Robin Arzt have made suggestions for replacement by a
Review Board.171 It may very well be that SSA has more to learn
from other agencies’ experiences. Professor Lubbers and the late
Judge Arzt suggested that all hearings should be reviewed by a single
body, similar to the Social Security court. Such an idea could lead to
cost savings through consolidation and elimination of duplication

167

Benitez-Silva et al., supra note 161, at 163–64.
I had the opportunity to hear hundreds of these cases in several states. I
would testify that the quality of representation varies, and if a claimant is able to
find the right lawyer, as the claimant controls the presentation of evidence in a nonadversarial setting, chances of losing are low. I also would testify that at least two
of my former colleagues denied almost every claim, but were reversed on appeal
every time. Many of these cases were remanded, and I heard many of the remands.
169
Administrative Law Judge Corps Act, S. 1275, 98th Cong. (1983).
170
Agency Structures, supra note 156.
171
Robin J. Arzt, Proposal for a United States Social Security Court 6 (2006)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/annual2006/Tab8Bproposal.pdf; Frank Bloch et
al., Introducing Nonadversarial Government Representatives to Improve the
Record for Decision in Social Security Disability Adjudications: A Report to the
Social
Security
Advisory
Board
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil.pdf; Paul Verkuil &
Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security
Disability Cases: A Report to the Social Security Advisory Board, STRATAGEM,
INC.
(Mar.
1,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/VerkuilLubbers.pdf.
168
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among agencies and result in judicial economy, while promoting
uniformity. At least one state has established such a court.172
It could also be that in the name of uniformity and fundamental
fairness, Congress should include non-APA agencies. A 1992 study
by former Administrative Law Judge John H. Frye III (based on 1989
data) identified about eighty-three case-types (involving about
343,000 cases annually) of non-APA adjudication. Frye identified
2,692 Presiding Officers in the federal service. Of the eighty-three
case-types, fifteen accounted for 98% of the total.
By far, the greatest number of non-APA adjudications involves
immigration deportation cases, where an Immigration Judge (IJ)
“shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or
deportability of an alien.” In context, it is clear that the IJ is to
conduct an evidentiary proceeding. For example, an alien “shall have
reasonable opportunity to present evidence and cross examine
witnesses presented by the government.” The IJ is authorized to
administer oaths, receive evidence, and issue subpoenas; the IJ must
rule on evidentiary objections and provide findings and reasons for
decisions.173 In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950),
the Supreme Court determined that the APA governed the enabling
statute. However, Congress subsequently removed this requirement.
There are dozens of Circuit Court decisions, which state that Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions should follow the APA
formula.174 The ABA issued a report in February 2010, Reforming

The Commonwealth Court is one of Pennsylvania’s two statewide
intermediate appellate courts and is unlike any other state court in the nation.
Article V, section 4 of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution created the
Commonwealth Court. It was established in 1970.
173
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(1)(a)(1), (b)(1), (4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 240.1(c).
174
Noting the high reversal rates of the BIA in the Courts of Appeals, Judge
Richard Posner wrote:
172

This tension between judicial and administrative adjudicators is
not due to judicial hostility to the nation’s immigration policies
or to a misconception of the proper standard of judicial review of
administrative decisions. It is due to the fact that the adjudication
of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice. Whether this is due to
resource constraints or to other circumstances beyond the Board's
and the Immigration Court’s control, we do not know, though we
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the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence,
Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of
Removal Cases, approved as ABA policy. While it did not
recommend that IJ hearings should be APA hearings, or that IJs be
selected using the OPM register, it recommended that the BIA and
IJs be removed from the Department of Justice and that a Title I
Immigration Court be established.175 At its June 2012 Plenary
Session, ACUS approved a recommendation to streamline federal
immigration courts but did not accept the ABA suggestions.176

note that the problem is not of recent origin. All that is clear is
that it cannot be in the interest of the immigration authorities, the
taxpayer, the federal judiciary, or citizens concerned with the
effective enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws for
removal orders to be routinely nullified by the courts, and that the
power of correction lies in the Department of Homeland Security,
which prosecutes removal cases, and the Department of Justice,
which adjudicates them in its Immigration Court and Board of
Immigration Appeals . . . . And anyway punishment was not the
rationale of the Board’s action, which appears to have been
completely arbitrary. The order of removal is vacated . . . .
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations
omitted). Many other Circuit Court opinions express similar views.
175
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION 114B,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION (2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/midyear/su
mmary_of_recommendations/114B.authcheckdam.doc.
See also Dana Leigh
Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 1, 14 n.71 (2008);
Arnold & Porter, LLP, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote
Independence, Fairness Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of
Removal Cases, ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION (2010).
176
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, IMMIGRATION
REMOVAL ADJUDICATION: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION (June 14-15, 2012),
available
at
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ProposedImmigration-Rem.-Adj.-Recommendation-for-Plenary-5-22-12.pdf. See also Lenni
B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Taking Steps to Enhance Quality and Timeliness
in Immigration Removal Adjudication, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED
STATES
(Jan.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ACUS-Immigration-RemovalAdjudication-Draft-Report-1_12_12.pdf. Professor Lubbers states that from the
beginning, ACUS excluded these “major structural issues” from its scope.
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Moreover, the Justice Department hired IJs on a political basis,177
and after litigation, suspended all hiring of BIA members and IJs in
January 2007.178 DOJ has settled with rejected applicants who were
apparently better qualified than some of those hired who apparently
remain IJs. It has a new selection method, but the public and the
American bar have no input.179 Although it was suggested180 that the
Justice Department use the OPM register or hire from the existing
register, or create an internal register based on merit selection, to try
to avoid the appearance of political favoritism and agency bias,
neither the ABA Commission nor ACUS recommended it.
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the
Department of Justice (DOJ) currently has one ALJ, who adjudicates

177

An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling
and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General, Evidence and Analysis:
Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals Member Hiring Decisions,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE (June 28, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter “IG Report”]; see
also Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based On
GOP Ties, THE WASH. POST (June 11, 2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html.
178
IG Report, supra note 177. The Justice Department official was
reprimanded by the Virginia bar for politicizing the Justice Department's hiring and
promotion process. Ryan J. Reilly, Monica Goodling Reprimanded By Virginia
State
Bar,
TPMMUCKRACKER
(May
6,
2011),
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/05/monica_goodling.php.
179
Under the new process, EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
(OCIJ) reviews applications and rates each candidate. Three-member EOIR panels
of two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges or Assistant Chief Immigration Judges
and a senior EOIR manager also perform a review. Selectees are reviewed by the
EOIR Director (or his designee) and the Chief Immigration Judge, who together
select at least three candidates for a vacancy to recommend for final consideration.
A second three-member panel, comprised of the EOIR Director (or his designee), a
career SES employee designated by the Deputy Attorney General, and a non-career
member of the SES designated by the Deputy Attorney General, then conduct
interviews. This panel recommends one candidate for the Deputy Attorney General
to recommend to the Attorney General for final approval. Both the Deputy
Attorney General and the Attorney General can request additional candidates if
they do not approve the candidates forwarded to them. IG Report, supra note 177.
180
Mainly by FALJC and NCALJ.
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(1) employer sanctions cases,181 (2) unfair immigration-related
employment practices,182 and (3) document fraud.183 At times, she
has been asked to sit on the BIA and sometimes has been loaned to
other agencies. Wherever and whenever she sits, the APA applies to
the proceeding.
At DOL, administrative law judges comprise the Board of Alien
Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) under the Immigration &
Nationality Act (INA), which hears claims for permanent
certification and most of the decisions are en banc. Individual judges
hear H-1B visa cases and other temporary INA visa cases. The
Department of State issues the visas.
The Contract Disputes Act provides that a board of contract
appeals shall “provide to the fullest extent practicable informal,
expeditious, and inexpensive resolution of disputes and shall issue
decisions in writing.”184 A member may administer oaths, authorize
depositions, and subpoena witnesses for taking of testimony. Again,
the context makes clear that an evidentiary hearing is intended. 185 At
181

Employer sanctions cases are brought by the Department of Homeland
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) when the agency issues a
Notice of Intent to Fine to the employer, and the employer requests a hearing. If
liability is found, the ALJ can impose monetary sanctions, issue a cease and desist
order, and award attorney’s fees. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2012); Daniel F.
Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 476 (2011); Executive Office for Immigration Review
Releases FY 2010 Statistical Year Book, Book Includes Pending Caseload Numbers
for the Immigration Courts, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/2010SYB02012011.htm (last visited May
18, 2013).
182
These cases are usually initiated when an individual files a charge with the
Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices
(OSC), within the Civil Rights Division. The OSC investigates the charge, and
then determines whether or not to file a complaint with OCAHO on behalf of the
charging party. If the OSC does not file a complaint, the charging party may file an
individual complaint with OCAHO. If liability is found, the ALJ can award back
pay, order hiring or reinstatement, and civil penalties where OSC is the
complainant. See citations accompanying note 181.
183
This provision establishes civil penalties for document fraud that relates to
satisfying an immigration law requirement or obtaining and immigration-related
benefits. Document fraud cases are brought and adjudicated much like employer
sanctions cases. See citations accompanying note 181.
184
41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2012).
185
41 U.S.C. §§ 607(e), 610 (2012).
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one time, three of my colleagues, administrative law judges, also
constituted the DOL Board of Contract Appeals (BCA). Although
these may not be APA hearings, once an administrative law judge is
assigned to hear them, they become so.
The same is true at the MSPB. None of the assigned judges are
administrative law judges. However, when an administrative law
judge is borrowed by the agency, the proceedings are APA hearings.
Although the Veterans’ Administration (VA) holds hearings, the
APA does not govern them.186 Boards of Veterans Appeal (BVA)
hearings are informal and non-adversarial.187 Members of the Board
review benefit claims determinations made by local VA offices and
issue decisions on appeals.
These “law judges,” attorneys
experienced in veterans’ law and in reviewing benefit claims, are the
only ones who can issue Board decisions.188 Staff attorneys, also
trained in veterans’ law, review the facts of each appeal and assist the
Board members.189 Persons claiming VA benefits are not generally
represented by lawyers, and the government is not represented at all.
There have been some suggestions that the process should use
aspects of the APA, especially the substantial evidence test.190 In
2003, the ABA recommended that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
select members of the BVA through procedures supposedly modeled
on those used for the selection of administrative law judges and
board of contract appeals judges.191
The ABA also urges that non-APA employment discrimination
hearings conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
186

38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(a), 7107(b) (2012).
See 38 C.F.R. §20.700(c) (2011).
188
The judges are not ALJs.
189
38 U.S.C. §§ 7103, 7104 (2012).
190
See Ronald L. Smith, VA Implementation of the Informal and NonAdversarial Claims Adjudication System May Not Be Serving Veterans Well, (Nov.
1, 2001) (presented at the Fall Meeting of the Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice, Washington, D.C.). I served in a panel discussion with Mr.
Smith as moderator to discuss the ramifications of applying the APA to VA
hearings. The bar and some appellate judges present universally favored adoption
of the APA. Id. The opposition came mostly from BVA judges who advised that
if the substantial evidence test supplanted the clear and convincing test now in
force, they would have to write lengthy time-consuming decisions. Id.
191
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report and Recommendation Number 102
(Aug. 11–12, 2003).
187
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Commission (EEOC) become subject to the APA.192 EEOC hearings
determine the rights of federal employees, applicants for
employment, and former employees under the various nondiscrimination statutes which EEOC also enforces in the private
sector, including Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of
1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq.; and the Americans
with Disabilities Amendment Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Since
adoption of the ABA policy, the EEOC has been negotiating to
voluntarily adopt the APA.
Although the interests of the agencies have been the paramount
factor in determining whether the hearings should follow the APA,
the main factors should be whether the hearings are fair and whether
this is communicated to the public.
Considering the potential of added agencies that may be included
as noted above, it very well may be that if procedures were
consolidated, it might lead to greater judicial economy and also to
substantial potential savings far beyond the $20 million contemplated
by Congress when the Corps Bill was under consideration.
VIII.

INDIVIDUAL DUE PROCESS V. “OUTCOMES ANALYSIS”

Under our Constitution, litigants are supposed to have a right to
present their claims, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
have a fair opportunity to be heard by an impartial adjudicator. “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.”193 When a party becomes the target of an
individualized governmental decision, that party should have a right

192

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report and Recommendation Number 124
(Aug. 8–9, 2011). Although this resolution passed virtually unanimously at the
House of Delegates, there was some opposition from the Administrative Law
Section.
193
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses
the same words, called the “Due Process Clause,” to describe a legal obligation of
all states. Although the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies only in
criminal cases, case law and the APA extend it. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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to an individualized determination.194 Most agency hearings are
modeled after the common law system contemplated in the right to a
fair trial under the Fifth Amendment. The hearings are similar to
bench trials before United States District Courts.195
The exceptions are at SSA and CMS, where the form of hearing
is “non-adversarial,” as the claimant seeking benefits may be
represented, but the agency is not. Critics to this process assume
certain facts, sometimes using outcomes analysis, to determine that
the result should be determinative of the process. Relying on an oft
cited SSA case, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), critics
of individual due process rely on a majority statement that SSA
hearings do not require the same level of due process protections
under the Fourteenth Amendment as in other administrative law
cases.196 In another Social Security case, Mathews v. Eldridge,197
parties protected by the due process clause are entitled to “some form
of hearing.”198 The Mathews Court determined that a hearing is not
required prior to the termination of Social Security disability
payments, and the administrative procedures prescribed under the
Act fully comport with due process. Critics argue that the elements
of that hearing are not defined, and depend on the circumstances of
the particular program at issue. There was no mention of the APA in
Mathews; and in Perales, the court specifically stated that it did not
consider the APA. However, after Perales and Mathews, Congress
ended any confusion regarding the applicability of the APA to the
Social Security Act by enacting “[a]n Act to amend the Social
Security Act to expedite the holding of hearings under titles II, XVI
194

Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743 (2002); Rhode Island Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st
Cir. 2002).
196
Specifically, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), when the Supreme
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires an evidentiary hearing before a recipient of
certain government benefits (such as welfare) can be deprived of such benefits. Id.
at 261. The individual losing benefits is not entitled to a trial, but is entitled to an
oral hearing before an impartial decision-maker, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and the right to a written opinion setting out the evidence relied
upon and the legal basis for the decision. Id. at 268–70.
197 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
198 Id. at 333.
195
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and XVIII by establishing uniform review procedures, and for other
purposes.”199 Under this and later statutes, SSA hearings are APA
hearings.200
In a more recent case, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v.
Whitman,201 although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
provided a “hearing” before its Environmental Appeals Board
(EAB), comprised of non-ALJs, the 11th Circuit found it did not meet
APA hearing requirements.202
Moreover, the APA dictates differences in evaluation among
agency adjudicators. For example, a Social Security ALJ’s factual
determination is entitled to deference, while a factual determination
by the Social Security Appeals Council is not.203
After noting the unique process, and after determining that the
outcomes are unfair, the following suggestions have been offered for
SSA hearings:

199

Pub L. No. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135–37 (1976). The House Reports of the bill

states:
To avoid any possible misinterpretation, the bill specifically
provides that the temporary hearing officers authorized to
conduct hearings under the bill would be subject to all the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that assure
independence from agency control . . . . However, the specific
application of these provisions of the APA, together with the
provisions of the bill applying the same procedural safeguards to
review proceedings under title XVI as apply under title II, should
eliminate the possibility of the courts determining that SSI
review procedures do not comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act or due process.
Id. Similar language is in the Senate Report.
200
Id. See also Conversion of Temporary Administrative Law Judges, H.R.
Rep. No. 617, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977); UNITED STATES CONGRESS HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, CONVERSION OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 5723 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office,
1977).
201
336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2096 (2004).
202
Professor Lubbers argues that there’s no indication that EPA could have
satisfied the court if it had used ALJs instead. Email from Jeffrey S. Lubbers to
author (on file with author).
203
Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1986).
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1. Use of rulemaking by SSA to reduce the number
of issues that must be heard at hearing.204
Professor Lubbers argues that there might be other general factual
issues that could be resolved as fairly and more efficiently through
rulemaking as through case-by-case adjudication.205
2. Modifying the role of the Appeals Council.
Professor Lubbers suggests replacement of the SSA Appeals
Council with a Decision Review Board for the Appeals Council, with
power to review both allowances and denials.206
3. Consider establishment of a Social Security Court.
Professor Lubbers cites to increases in the numbers of appeals
and a lack of uniformity among the district court decisions.207 He
cites to a study that showed “a wide range of outright allowances (not
including the numerous remands) among the 48 district courts that
had over 100 appeals, with a high of about 28% and a low of
zero.”208
4. Introduce government attorneys/adversarial hearings.
Professor Lubbers notes that the non-adversarial system makes a
judge’s job more difficult, and asks that “counselors,” not
prosecutors, should be used, as “[he is] not convinced that the
benefits of transforming the program from an inquisitorial to an

204

See Testimony of Jeffrey S. Lubbers: Before the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 112th Cong. (June 27,
2012), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/lubbers_testimony.pdf [hereinafter
Testimony of Lubbers].
205
Id.
206
This process was tried on an experimental basis in one geographic region
but was abandoned.
207
Testimony of Lubbers, supra note 204, at 9–10.
208
Id. at 15.
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adversary program would outweigh the considerable costs of doing
so.”209
On July 22, 2010 the CBO issued “Social Security Disability
Insurance: Participation Trends and Their Fiscal Implications,”210 and
on July 16, 2012 issued “Policy Options for the Social Security
Disability Insurance Program.”211 CBO evaluated how SSA hires
and trains “employees” who conduct disability application hearings.
It discussed SSA representation at hearings, “which in the short term
would add certain costs for hiring and training but might over the
long run result in lower spending for the program because fewer
people would be admitted.”212
If the government were represented, ABA policy would require
the agency to provide free representation to pro se claimants under
the ABA Model Access Act.213
5. Eliminate the right to a hearing before an administrative law
judge.
Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., argues214 that the decisions of the
state agencies at SSA are more accurate than those of the judges.215
209

Id. at 16.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE:
PARTICIPATION TRENDS AND THEIR FISCAL IMPLICATIONS, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET
ISSUE
BRIEF
(July
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/116xx/doc11673/07-22ssdisabilityins_brief.pdf.
211
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM (July 16, 2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43421DisabilityInsurance_print.pdf.
212
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 15 (July 16, 2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43421DisabilityInsurance_print.pdf.
213
ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_de
fendants/ls_sclaid_104_revised_final_aug_2010.authcheckdam.pdf.
214
Richard J. Pierce, What Should We Do About Administrative Law Judge
Disability Decisionmaking? CATO: REGULATION (2011), available at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n33.pdf.
210
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He relies in large part on the assumption that the decisions rendered
by judges are inaccurate.216 Pierce also references Justice Antonin
Scalia, “The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise,”217 who argued that judges
impose the “highest” salaries and occupy a high proportion (24% to
73%) of the Senior Executive Service in each agency.218
In some agencies, because of “performance awards” and the right
to overtime pay, some administrative law judges make less than the
staff.219 Also, administrative law judges are not part of the Senior
Executive Service. Professor Pierce argues that billions of dollars
could be saved in that manner.220
Over time, a number of suggestions would have included other
agencies. Agencies continue to have an irresistible impulse to
appoint their own judges without regard to claims of favoritism and
bias. There were attempts to appoint non-APA judges to hear cases
currently heard by APA judges at the International Trade
Commission. There have been attempts to curtail APA procedures at
the Small Business Administration, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), the Energy Department (FERC), and the

215

He also accuses USDC judges of failing to follow the law:
District judges should be instructed to review SSA
decisions as final decisions based solely on the record
created at the agency. At present, district judges are
required to permit applicants who appeal a decision
denying benefits to obtain a remand to SSA to allow the
applicant to introduce new evidence. That is not the way
other agency review proceedings are conducted. The
norm in other contexts is judicial review based solely on
the record before the agency.

Id. at 40. In many contexts, this is certainly not the case.
216
Id. at 36.
217
Justice Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57
(1979).
218
Id.
219
This is especially true at agencies such as the SEC where the staff is entitled
to enrichment pay, while administrative law judges receive pay under the AL
schedule. In an anomaly, some law clerks may be able to make more than their
employing judges.
220
See Pierce, supra note 214, at 36.
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Department of Education; and, at present, there is a bill in Congress
to abolish the EPA and, with it, its hearing program.221
6. Demote or remove administrative law judges.222
Professor Pierce argues that Social Security judges are
“unconstitutional,” referencing Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Board (PCAOB), 130 U.S. 3138 (2010).
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause,
requires that the president, and no one else, pick the principal Federal
officers (with Senate approval), while permitting “heads of
departments” to pick “inferior officers,”223 who are supervised and
directed by “principal officers.” PCAOB members are not picked by
the president, but by the SEC commissioners as a group. By striking
the restrictions on removing PCAOB members, and thus making
them subject to termination at will by the SEC, the Court was able to
render PCAOB members inferior officers who could be validly
picked by someone other than the president under the Appointments
Clause.
221

Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity
Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65 (1996). He argued then and maintains now
that agencies are “vot[ing] with their feet” because of the problems with the ALJ
program. Id. at 72. If that was true then, it was because of politics. I find that
when the economies of scale and the danger of public anger due to perceived
injustices are factored, due process under the APA is a bargain.
222
He would require employers to share the cost of disability decisions;
require SSA review of past decisions to grant benefits; implement SSA quality
controls on judges; and eliminate nonexertional restrictions as a potential disability.
223

He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Thus, Professor Pierce, by analogy, states that in order to be
“inferior,” one must be subservient, and finds that SSA judges are
actually “principal,” rather than “inferior” officers, since they are
unaccountable to the agency for their decisions.224
Further, he cites to Landry v. FDIC225 to argue that as the SSA
decisions are “final,” they are “officers of the United States” rather
than employees, who would render only recommended decisions as
the FDIC administrative law judge was required to do.226 He argues
that SSA’s rules allow an appeal of an SSA judge’s decision to a
higher authority in the agency “only at the behest of an applicant
whose application for benefits has been denied by an ALJ.” 227 ALJ
decisions that grant benefits are final.228 They are not reviewable by
any institution of government.229 Thus, it is clear that SSA ALJs are
“officers” as that term is used in the constitution.
However, SSA has had “own motion” review of selected
decisions for many years.230 Therefore, the predicate to the

224

Professor Lubbers states that the discussion of the constitutionality of forcause protection for ALJs appointed by agency officials who also have for-cause
protection after the PCAOB case should also discuss Intercollegiate Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012). It finds,
among other things, that the “for cause” removal provision protecting the Board
judges is unconstitutional because it contributes to making them principal officers
that would (if the provision were not severed) make the judges’ appointment
violative of the Appointments Clause. Id.
However, those judges were not APA judges with section 11 protections. I
also note that the agency, the Library of Congress, capitulated to pressure and
acquiesced. Under the APA, OPM would, I argue, have an affirmative, statutory
duty to intercede on behalf of the judges.
225
204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
226
Pierce, supra note 214, at 40.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Section 304(g) of Public Law 96-265, enacted June 9, 1980, states that:
“The Secretary . . . shall implement a program of reviewing, on his own motion,
decisions rendered by administrative law judges as a result of hearings under
section 221(d) of the Social Security Act . . . .” For Example, see SSR 82-13:
“OHA [now ODAR] will conduct a comprehensive, ongoing program under which
a prescribed percentage of administrative law judge decisions involving the issue of
disability, particularly those allowing previously denied claims for disability
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argument, that “[award decisions] are not reviewable by any
institution of government,” is not accurate.231 If Landry is supposed
to apply to every other agency besides the FDIC, it did not
contemplate that an agency may delegate any powers it may have to
an “inferior” officer, or recognize that Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution does not expressly limit delegation of agency authority.
Moreover, although decisions may be “final,” they may be
reviewable. For example, almost all of the decisions I render at the
Department of Labor involve several parties. Whereas at one time, in
some categories of cases we rendered only recommended decisions,
and some of those were automatically reviewed, by August 31, 2010,
our rules were changed to convert most of the former recommended
decisions to “final” decisions. The parties, including my agency, are
free to appeal.
7. Recently, Samuel Johnson, the Chair of the Subcommittee on
Social Security, House Ways and Means Committee, inquired
whether it would be possible to replace the SSA judges.
This has been considered intermittently since state disability was
acquired by Social Security in 1973. Former chairmen of the
Subcommittee, such as James Bunning, advocated permitting the
state agency DDS determination to be the “final” determination.
Professor Lubbers wrote about it in “APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest
for Uniformity Faltering?,”232 regarding use of non-APA judges.

benefits, will be evaluated prior to their effectuation, even though there is no
request for review.”
231
Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Scapegoating Social Security Disability
Claimants (and the Judges Who Evaluate Them), AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issuebriefs/scapegoating-social-security-disability-claimants-and-the-judges-who-evalu.
They find that Professor Pierce misinterprets the problem with the system and find
that his proposed solutions are misguided.
Whereas Pierce asserts that the “increase in the proportion of the population
that has been determined to be permanently disabled is attributable to ALJ
decisions,” they note that administrative law judge decisions amount to a relatively
small portion of disability awards, as the DDS perform 75% of total annual awards.
Id. But they also do not address that there is no uniformity to the DDS
determinations.
232
Lubbers, supra note 221.
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When the SSI program was created, although the judges who heard
SSI cases were employees of SSA, they were not APA judges,
although their colleagues who heard SSA disability insurance
benefits cases were.233
In 2005, the ABA suggested the opposite, that Congress should
extend due process rights beyond traditional APA cases.234 It
categorized the APA cases as “Type A” adjudication.235 In the report
to the ABA House of Delegates, the Administrative Law Section
noted that numerous statutes that call for evidentiary hearings as part
of regulatory or benefit programs are not governed by the APA’s
adjudication provisions.236
These were termed, “Type B”
237
adjudications.
Although the following are not contained in the
actual recommendation, they include:
1. Extend certain APA procedural protections to Type B
adjudication.
2.

Require adoption of ethical standards for ALJs and POs
(presiding officers in non-APA hearings) and protect full-time
POs against removal or discipline without cause.

3. Clarify the definitions of rule and adjudication under the APA.
4. Clarify the circumstances in which newly adopted adjudication
schemes will be Type A as opposed to Type B adjudication.
5. Clarify the APA provisions relating to evidence.
6. Clarify the ability of all adjudicating agencies to issue declaratory
orders.
7.

Clarify the right to obtain transcripts at agency’s cost of
duplication.

233
234

See Lubbers, supra note 221, regarding use of non-APA judges.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report and Recommendation Number 114

(2005).
235

Id.
Id.
237
Id.
236
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8. Clarify that legislation adopted pursuant to these
recommendations will supersede existing contrary statutory
provisions.238
In 2000, the ABA determined that Congress should prefer APA
adjudication over other forms, and recommended that it create a
default provision:239 If Congress failed to include language
concerning application of the APA to a statute, it would be presumed
that the APA should control.240 Although Congress has not enacted
these provisions, they remain ABA policy and remain broader ideas
about uniformity than any of the suggestions set forth above.
As of this writing, neither the Commissioner of Social Security or
OPM has responded to Chairman Johnson. However, it is clear that
the APA must be applied uniformly except where Congress has
expressly stated otherwise.241 So far, neither Professor Pierce nor
anyone else has directed the Chairman to an express, or even an
implied, statement in the Social Security Act that would preclude
application of the Act.
IX. FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review, I find that Congress, nor anyone else, has
performed an extensive review of APA adjudication. Therefore,
most of the “outcomes” assumptions about APA adjudication are
mere folklore. Although it is probably true that adversarial hearing
decisions are more valid than inquisitional hearings, no data has been
produced to verify this fact.
I also find that the “cost” of having an unbiased adjudicator
cannot be measured in purely economic terms.242 If decisions are
continually considered to be unfair, the reputation of every agency
and the entire government may be jeopardized. Therefore, the public
interest must be factored into any consideration.
Moreover,
238

Id.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 234.
240
Id.
241
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
242
“Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole
constitutional system.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
239
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uniformity may bring judicial and economic economies, which might
make due process a bargain.243
Although the functions of administrative law judges are clearly
judicial, not “executive,” OPM and the employing agencies consider
ALJs as “mere” employees. In fact, when representatives of the
administrative law judge organizations met with the current OPM
Director for the first time, he stated that administrative law judges
were “judicial” and that judicial rules should apply. In the ensuing
three years since the Director made that statement, however, OPM
has not changed its position.244 Section 11 of the APA and Nash v.
Califano provide otherwise.
It is not clear whether the investigators of the studies about SSA
are aware that decision making has been “dumbed down,” first by use
of the “sequential evaluation,” which requires a judge to make certain
findings,245 and also by the listings of impairments,246 which if met,

243

In 1989, the CBO determined that conservatively, a Corps Bill could save
$20 million per year. In 2012, that amount would yield approximately $140
million.
244
See Mahoney v. Donovan, 824 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2011). The court
dismissed the suit, holding that: (1) ALJ failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to retaliation claim under Rehabilitation Act; (2) ALJ did not
suffer materially adverse employment action; (3) ALJ was not subjected to hostile
work environment; and (4) ALJ lacked standing to bring APA claims. Id.
Mahoney, the Chief ALJ at HUD, alleges that, among other things, that HUD
officials selectively assigned cases based on political considerations and failed to
provide adequate resources for legal research. Although he asked OPM to review
his allegations, they failed to protect his judicial independence, stating that as a
mere employee, he had a duty to follow orders, even if they were unreasonable and
violated the APA. Id.
245
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and § 416.920:
The five-step sequential evaluation process. The sequential evaluation
process is a series of five “steps” that we follow in a set order. If we
can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we make our
determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step. If we
cannot find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we go on to
the next step. Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your
residual functional capacity. (See paragraph (e) of this section). We
use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four and
step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps. These are the five
steps we follow:
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provide an automatic award without further development by the
administrative law judge. A judge is not free to award benefits
without addressing the sequential evaluation. I assume most of the
appellate decisions that reversed the SSA denial decisions are
rendered because “substantial evidence” does not address certain
shifting of the burdens of proof from the claimant to the
government;247 and, as the government was not represented at the

(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you
are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not
disabled.
(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your
impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in §
404.1509, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the
duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.
(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your
impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one
of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you are disabled.
(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual
functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do
your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled.
(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your
residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work
experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you
can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are not
disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to other work, we will find
that you are disabled.
246
The Listing of Impairments describes, for each major body system,
impairments considered severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any
gainful activity (or in the case of children under age 18 applying for SSI, severe
enough to cause marked and severe functional limitations). Most of the listed
impairments are permanent or expected to result in death, or the listing includes a
specific statement of duration is made. For all other listings, the evidence must
show that the impairment has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of
at least 12 months. The criteria in the Listing of Impairments are applicable to
evaluation of claims for disability benefits under the Social Security disability
insurance program or payments under both the SSI program. 20 C.F.R pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1.
247
For example, in adult disability hearings, once it is determined that a
claimant who has a medically determinable impairment cannot return to former
work, the burden shifts to SSA to prove that there are jobs that exist in the national
economy that the claimant can perform. See step (v), supra note 245.

Spring 2013

Fundamental Fairness

125

hearing and the claimants were, the burden has not been met.248
Moreover, at SSA, the judge has the duty to develop the record to
benefit the claimant.249 This is no mean trick.250
Moreover, the professors rely in large part on Professor Verkuil’s
“outcomes analysis” methodology of investigating the data attributed
to court review. If the data is accurate, why not apply regression
analysis (and, if so, what type of regression), analysis of variance,
structural equation modeling, survival analysis, or some other
technique? There also is no mention of the fact that the Social
Security Act, unlike most other statutes, is a “humanitarian” statute
that is claimant friendly, and is interpreted accordingly.251

248

In writing this paper, I asked SSA statisticians whether they could
determine at which step of the sequential evaluation an award or denial is made.
Apparently, they cannot. It would be interesting to determine what percentage of
claims are denied because a claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activities at
step one, or what percentage of claims are denied because no medically
determinable impairment was proven at step two, etc. Although SSA judges hear
claims “de novo,” it would be interesting to enquire whether appeals can be limited
only to jurisdiction and/or standing before a presentation of further evidence can be
proffered.
249
Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2001); Haley v. Massanari, 258
F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2000).
250
Although Perales is often cited for the proposition that ALJs wear three
hats, the Court decision actually states:
[We are not persuaded] by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat
suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too
many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental
structure of great and growing complexity. The Hearing
Examiner [ALJ] . . . does not act as counsel. He acts as an
examiner charged with developing the facts.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). The decision was six to three;
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion. Id.
251
E.g., the Social Security Act is a remedial statute which must be liberally
construed in favor of disability if a disability is proven. See Combs v. Gardner, 382
F.2d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1967); Polly v. Gardner, 364 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1966).
“[S]ince the Act is remedial in nature, it should be given a liberal construction in
order to effectuate its purpose.” SSR 71-30: Sections 413(a), 413(b), and 422(d),
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; Sections 223(a), 223(b), and
224(a), Social Security Act — Disability Insurance Benefits — Black Lung Benefits
— Monthly Payment Period, SOCIAL SECURITY AND ACQUIESCENCE RULINGS,
available at http:// http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/09/SSR71-
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Professor Lubbers cited to Heckler v. Campbell, in which the
Court upheld the agency’s use of its “medical-vocational guidelines,”
which determined “the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the
national economy,” so that the issue did not have to be re-determined
in every individual adjudication and suggested more regulations to
eliminate the need for fact finding.
If SSA wants to manage outcomes of its decisions, it could
determine:
1. Whether claimants, rather than administrative law judges, should
bear responsibility for developing the record. Whereas claimants
were once universally pro se, they now are almost universally
represented, most by competent counsel;
2. Whether the decisions at all levels should be made public and that
legal opinions regarding disability should be published; 252
3. Whether principles of vocational rehabilitation should be
applied;253 and

30-di-09.html (last visited May 18, 2013); and many other case decisions.
Likewise, in DOL workers’ compensation type cases, “[a]ll doubts are to be
construed in favor of the employee in accordance with the remedial purposes of the
Act.” Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 115 (5th
Cir. 1980). See also Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and
Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L. REV. 9 (2000). Professor Mullins is also author
of the Manual for Administrative Law Judges. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Manual for
Administrative Law Judges, http://ualr.edu/malj/malj.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
252
In a recent request to the SSA Inspector General, senators complained that
at least 100 of the 1,500 judges at Social Security are approving 90% or more of
the cases they review. “These numbers defy conventional logic and demand
further scrutiny.” Letter to Patrick J. Carroll from United States Senate’s
Committee on Finance (May 20, 2011) (on file with author).
The agency is overly concerned with the Privacy Act of 1974, and could
“sanitize” its decisions, so that Congress and the public could read judges’
decisions. Sunlight may be a better disinfectant. Professor Lubbers asks whether I
would open the determinations at all levels. I would. At common law, all
government determinations should be open. That does not mean that the patient
records should be open.
253
In evaluating disability claims, SSA does not recognize that under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), including changes made by the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008)),
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4. Whether the medical vocational guidelines are still relevant as the
world of work has changed. The last update of the Department of

require that certain accommodations to the workplace must be considered. At my
agency, in cases involving the Longshore and Harborworkers’ Act and extensions,
once a claimant has a disability, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
there may be “suitable alternate employment.” At SSA, the burden is on the
government to show:
If an individual cannot perform any past relevant work because
of a severe impairment(s), but the remaining physical and mental
capacities are consistent with meeting the physical and mental
demands of a significant number of jobs (in one or more
occupations) in the national economy, and the individual has the
vocational capabilities (considering age, education, and past
work experience) to make an adjustment to work different from
that performed in the past, it shall be determined that the
individual is not disabled. However, if an individual’s physical
and mental capacities in conjunction with his or her vocational
capabilities (considering age, education and past work
experience) do not permit the individual to adjust to work
different from that performed in the past, it shall be determined
that the individual is disabled.
SSR 86-8: SSR 86-8: Titles II and XVI: The Sequential Evaluation Process, SOCIAL
SECURITY
AND
ACQUIESCENCE
RULINGS,
available
at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/01/SSR86-08-di-01.html (last
visited May 18, 2013). Therefore, if a person had no or limited skills acquired
from past relevant work, “disability” is directed as a matter of law. Id.
Although this is the subject of another paper, I find that they cannot
distinguish between SSA DIB claims, where the claimant is, in effect, seeking early
retirement, because (s)he is fully and currently insured, having paid into the trust
fund through FICA taxes, and “pure” SSI claimants, who generally have NO work
history and have no insured status. If SSI claimants have no work history,
theoretically, they are automatically “disabled” under the “grids” at age forty-five if
they have any medically determinable restriction.
In fiscal year 2011, 66.1% of claimants who applied at the initial stage
were approved in Puerto Rico. Of those rejected, 37.4% were awarded at the
reconsideration level. There is no indication in the statistics how many of those
appealed. See Statistics (NOSSCR Forum), supra note 161. At the hearings level,
at least one SSA ALJ in Puerto Rico had a 100% approval rate. See also Damien
Paletta, Puerto Rico Disability Claims Probed, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept.
11,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903532804576564543481258206.
html. However, all of these claims involve claimants who have an earnings record
as there is no SSI in Puerto Rico.
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Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles was done in 1991. It is
reasonable to expect that the world of work has radically changed
over the past 20 years.
In addition, although obsessed with the administrative law judge
reversals, the Social Security Subcommittee of Ways and Means has
never investigated why state agencies have had such disparate results.
It also does not consider that although Social Security is a national
program, there may be demographic and geographic disparities.254
Agencies pay OPM a “tax” based on the numbers of their judges
to pay for the expense of administering the ALJ program. 255 OPM
has never accounted for the millions of dollars in receipts received
during the time that the Azdell litigation was pending. It certainly did
not expend them on the administrative law judge program.
Currently, OPM has been conducting a study to replace the
examination currently used for candidates for the register. It is clear
that this is a costly effort that is most probably unnecessary, as the
major factors for consideration should be trial experience, prior
judicial experience, and judicial temperament.256 However, OPM has
catered to agency demands to hire from within by watering the
requirements. It has not been certifying older applicants. It has not
been performing background checks, and although bar records can be
easily obtained to initiate an investigation, candidates with phony
credentials have been certified for hire.
OPM also has not met its obligations to enforce application of the
APA; has not promoted uniform rules of practice; has not established
a standard ethics code, which would have eliminated duplication and
costs for state CLE requirements now passed on to agencies; has not
promoted professionalism; has not been interested in continuing
254

For example, a claimant with transferrable skills to manufacturing bench
work may be “not disabled” in a region of the country where there may be a
“significant” number of manufacturing bench work jobs, but be found “disabled” in
a region where no such jobs exist.
255
$1633 per judge per annum. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS WITH THE OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SERVICES, A-05-1222144,
Table
1
(Feb.
2013),
available
at
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-05-12-22144.pdf.
256
The Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory Test (MMPI) is probably a better
indication of temperament than any of the instruments under consideration.
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judicial education or peer review; and has been, in essence, a toady
for SSA in maintaining the ALJ Register.
X. CASE STUDY IN THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY—SUBPOENA
POWER257
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
[restricting the right] to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”258 Although the First Amendment does not express
how, in furtherance of being able to seek redress, the APA Section
556(d) provides: “A party may present its case or defense by oral or
documentary evidence and conduct such cross-examination as may
be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”259
Parties should be able to prosecute or defend a case in any
manner deemed fit. It may be that the crucial witness cannot be
brought to testify. Although the APA authorizes subpoenas, some
agencies refuse to honor that provision.260 Although there have been
some suggestions from the ABA and even from ACUS to support
uniformity, Congress has not acted. For example, in 1974, ACUS
recommended that the APA should be amended: (1) To make agency
subpoenas available in all agency proceedings, both rulemaking and

257

This material has been submitted to ACUS and was used at a FALJC
seminar in 2009. It was compiled in conjunction with Todd Smythe, Esquire, Staff
Attorney, Office of Administrative Law Judges, United States Department of
Labor. Participants from several other agencies indicated that they have similar
difficulties.
258
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
259
5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).
260
At certain non-APA agencies, due process is not observed. Some restrict or
eliminate the right to cross-examine. For example, under VA regulations, no crossexamination is allowed in BVA hearings. However, the parties (presumably
including the PO) may ask “follow-up questions” of the witnesses. 38 C.F.R. §
20.700(c) (2012) (“Parties to the hearing will be permitted to ask questions,
including follow-up questions, of all witnesses, but cross-examination will not be
permitted.”). Similarly, IRS collection due process (CDP) hearings do not include
cross-examination. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(d)(1) A-D6 (2012) (“The taxpayer or
the taxpayer’s representative does not have the right to subpoena and examine
witnesses at a CDP hearing.”). The issues in a CDP hearing would not ordinarily
involve credibility conflicts, so cross-examination should not be necessary. At the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), panels have the authority to restrict crossexamination.
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adjudication, which are subject to sections 556 and 557 of Title 5,
United States Code, and (2) to make clear that the power to issue
subpoenas in such proceedings shall be delegated to presiding
officers.261 We propose the following amendments to implement this
recommendation:
1. Amend section 555(d) of Title 5, United States Code to read
as follows:
(d) Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be
issued to a party on request and, when required by
rules of procedure, on a statement or showing of
general relevance and reasonable scope of the
evidence sought. Each agency shall designate by rule
the officers, who shall include the presiding officer in
all proceedings subject to section 556 of this title,
authorized to sign and issue subpoenas. On contest,
the court shall sustain the subpoena or similar process
or demand to the extent that it is found to be in
accordance with law.
In a proceeding for
enforcement, the court shall issue an order requiring
the appearance of the witness or the production of the
evidence or data within a reasonable time under
penalty of punishment for contempt in case of
contumacious failure to comply.
2. Amend section 556 of title 5, United States Code to add the
words “subpoena authority”; in the heading after the words
“powers and duties”; to delete the words “authorized by law”
in subparagraph (c)(2), to redesignate subsections (d) and (e)
as (e) and (f) respectively, and to add the following
subsection (d):
(d) In any proceeding subject to the provisions of this
section, the agency is authorized to require by
subpoena any person to appear and testify or to appear
261

39 Fed. Reg. 23041 (June 26, 1974); Recommendation 74-1, Subpoena
Power in Formal Rulemaking and Formal Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-1
(1993).
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and produce books, papers, documents or tangible
things, or both, at a hearing or deposition at any
designated place. Subpoenas shall be issued and
enforced in accordance with the procedures set forth
in section 555(d) of this title. In case of failure or
refusal of any person to obey a subpoena, the agency,
through the Attorney General unless otherwise
authorized by law, may invoke the aid of the district
court of the United States for any district in which
such person is found or resides or transacts business in
requiring the attendance and testimony of such person
and the production by him of books, papers,
documents or tangible things. The authority granted
by this subsection is in addition to and not in
limitation of any other statutory authority for the
issuance of agency subpoenas and for the judicial
enforcement thereof.262
The APA provides that “[a]gency subpoenas authorized by law
shall be issued to a party on request and, when required by rules of
procedure, on a statement or showing of general relevance and
reasonable scope of the evidence sought.”263 The APA further
provides in the section describing the powers and duties of
administrative law judges that “[s]ubject to published rules of the
agency and within its powers, employees presiding at hearings may .
. . . issue subpoenas authorized by law.”264 In 1983, the Secretary of
Labor published Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative
Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges.265 Section
18.24 provides the general rule for issuance of subpoenas by the
Chief Administrative Law Judge or the presiding administrative law
judge.266 The provision states that the judge “may issue subpoenas as
authorized by statute or law upon written application of a party

262

Id.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (2012).
264
Id. § 556(c)(2).
265
Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the
Office of Administrative Law Judges, 29 C.F.R. § 18 (2012).
266
29 C.F.R. § 18.24 (2012).
263
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requiring attendance of witnesses and production of relevant papers,
books, documents, or tangible things in their possession and under
their control.”267
At the DOL, issuance of subpoenas by administrative law judges
is expressly authorized by the governing statute in many, if not most,
ALJ hearings. For example, Section 927(a) of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act specifically provides for issuance
of subpoenas in respect to claims for compensation under the Act.268
Beginning in the early 1980s and continuing through 2010,
Congress enacted a series of employee protection (‘whistleblower”)
laws relating to various safety and corporate financial matters.269
Seventeen of those laws include the right to request a hearing before
a Department of Labor (DOL) administrative law judge if a party
contests the findings of the investigatory agency.270 None of those
laws address whether or not an ALJ has the authority to issue
subpoenas, and for a number of years judges were divided on the
issue.
In Childers v. Carolina Power & Light. Co., the
267

Id.
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 927(a)
(2012). See generally Maine v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 18 BRBS 129, 132
(1986) (en banc); Sanchez v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 5 BRBS 458, 462 (1977).
269
See, e.g., Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures
and the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who
Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 320–21 (1993); 77
Fed. Reg. 71687, 72143 (Dec. 4, 2012).
270
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §
9610 (2012); Consumer Product Safety of 2008, 15 U.S.C § 2087; Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012);
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2012); Federal Rail Safety Act, 49
U.S.C. § 20109, as amended by P.L. No. 110-053, § 1521; Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); FDA Food Safety Modernization Act,
Section 402, 21 U.S.C. 399d (2012); National Transit Systems Security Act of
2007, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1142 (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(4) and 932(l) (2012); Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002,
49 U.S.C. § 60129 (2012); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9 (2012);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012); Seaman’s Protection Act,
46 U.S.C. § 2114 (2012); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2012);
Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2012); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2012); Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121
(2012).
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Administrative Review Board (ARB), which is delegated with the
authority to act for the Secretary of Labor in review or on appeal of
DOL whistleblower decisions, ruled that judges have inherent power
to issue subpoenas when a statute requires a formal trial-like
proceeding.271 The ARB reviewed statutory and decisional authority
and found that:
•

“[a]dministrative subpoenas are essential tools widely used by
agencies responsible for assuring compliance with health and
safety legislation.”272

•

although some authority had assumed that administrative
subpoena power is delegable only by express statutory terms,
closer review of the “express authorization” rule reveals that
it is not relevant to the question of whether agencies are
authorized to issue administrative subpoenas.273

•

statutory mandates for agencies to provide formal trial-type
hearings, for example, the ERA whistleblower provision,
necessarily encompass subpoena authority (citing authority to
effect that it would be incongruous to grant an agency
authority to adjudicate and make findings of fact, without also
providing the authority to assure the soundness of the fact
finding).274

•

an agency given the power to adjudicate is entitled to use
subpoenas “simply by virtue of the agency’s discretion to
choose procedural mechanisms.”275

The ARB noted in Immanuel v. United States Department of
Labor276 that the Fourth Circuit ruled that an administrative law

271

Childers v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 98-077, 2000 WL
1920346, at *7 (DOL Adm. Rev. Bd. Dec. 29, 2000).
272
Id. at *3.
273
Id. at *4, *6.
274
Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 795 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
275
Childers, 2000 WL 1920346, at *6–*7
276
No. 97-1987, 1998 WL 129932, at *5 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1998).
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judge “lack[s] subpoena authority under the whistleblower provision
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”277 “The Immanuel court
reasoned that administrative subpoenas must be authorized by
express terms in the enabling legislation because §§ 555(d) and
556(c)(2) of the APA state that agencies may issue subpoenas in
adjudications when ‘authorized by law.’”278 The ARB found that the
Immanuel court assumed that the term “authorized by law” means
“authorized by express statutory terms.”279 The ARB, however, held
that “‘[a]uthorized by law’ is clearly not the same as ‘authorized by
explicit statutory text.’”280
On July 27, 2001, the Acting Solicitor of Labor issued a
Memorandum to the Department’s Associate Solicitors, Regional
Solicitors and Associate Regional Solicitors, stating that the Childers
decision was wrongly decided, and directing that the Department’s
attorneys “should not rely on the Board’s dictum in requesting
subpoenas or responding to subpoenas in litigation before the
Department’s adjudicative agencies .”281 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia has found that an ALJ does not
have the authority to issue subpoenas under the whistleblower
provision of six environmental statutes.282
The Solicitor’s memo and the Bobreski decision, however, have
not prompted the ARB to revisit its ruling that judges have the
authority to issue subpoenas in whistleblower cases. In fact, in a case
arising under the H-1B nonimmigrant alien labor certification
regulations, the ARB expressly declined the Wage and Hour Division

277

Childers, 2000 WL 1920346, at *9.
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id. at *10.
281
Memorandum from the Acting Solicitor of Labor to U.S. Dep’t of Labor
Associate Solicitors, Regional Solicitors and Associate Regional Solicitors (July
27, 2001) (on file with author). See also PAUL GREENBERG, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION AND THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: A ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION 8
(2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-abaannual/papers/2003/greenberg.pdf
282
Bobreski v. U.S. EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Administrator’s request that the ARB reexamine and reject its
decision in Childers.283
Because DOL judges are bound by the Childers precedent, they
will issue subpoenas upon request in whistleblower cases unless the
case arises in the District of Columbia.284 However, the question of
ALJ authority to issue subpoenas in the absence of express statutory
authorization continues to be raised in whistleblower litigation before
the DOL.285
The subpoena issue is an example of Congressional inaction (or
inattention) to effectuate its intent. The DOL is not the only agency
affected. It is a due process issue. It may be that, had they been
reasonable, the agencies involved could have issued regulations to
provide parties the right to subpoena witnesses or could create
policies affirming the inherent right under the APA to issue
subpoenas to effectuate the interests of justice. If the Corps or
Conference were in force, that body could issue rules. Meanwhile,
although OPM has a duty to see whether the APA is being fairly
applied, it is apparently not interested.
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
After fully reviewing the relevant information, I make the
following suggestions.
In a perfect world, the public and
practitioners engaged in agency adjudication would be able to access
a single, user friendly, reliable resource to find out what the law and
regulations are, what the procedures might be, and what the nature of
the proceeding may entail. This resource would be accurately
Adm’r, Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Integrated Informatics,
Inc., ARB No. 08-127, 2011 WL 327977 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 31, 2011).
284
Meanwhile, there is a “rule of necessity” that requires judges to ensure that
statutory aims are carried out, and have inherent judicial power to make sure that
the interests of justice are protected. Included are rights of due process and the
right to confront one’s accuser. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941) (defining rules of procedure as the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them).
285
See, e.g., PAUL GREENBERG, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: A ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION 8 (2003), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/papers/2003/greenberg.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2013).
283
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annotated. ACUS would perform that service. However, it has
chosen not to do so.
Rather than analyze the differences in agency procedures, many
of which are irrational, logic dictates that it is more efficient to
provide that all hearings fit a norm, in the name of APA simplicity
and uniformity, rather than continue to perpetuate confusion.
1. In order to promote that
(1) agencies keep the public informed of their
organization, procedures and rules; and
(2) uniform standards be established for the conduct of
formal rulemaking and adjudication, 286
Congress should “score” to determine the relative costs of
uniformity:
(1) The Conference proposal of 2000, and
(2) The proposed Corps Bill of 1992, and
(3) A separate scoring should include the “Type B” judiciary
in each category.
2. In order to ensure that adjudication under the APA is impartial
and there are no taints of outside bias (or inside bias from the
nature of employment within an agency that has a stake in the
outcome of a case), Congress should immediately apply the Code
of Conduct for United States Judges287 to administrative law
judges.

286

See Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act

(1947).
287

See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnited
StatesJudges.aspx (last revised June 2, 2011).

